Part I Specification and Modeling by James B. D. Joshi et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERIAS Tech Report 2001-47 
 
GENERALIZED TEMPORAL ROLE BASED 
ACCESS CONTROL MODEL (GTRBAC) PART I 
Specification and Modeling 
 
by James B. D. Joshi, Elisa Bertino, Usman Latif, 
Arif Ghafoor 
 
Center for Education and Research in  
Information Assurance and Security, 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907 
 Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control Model (GTRBAC) 
Part I 
Specification and Modeling 
 
 
James B. D. Joshi
#, Elisa Bertino
*, Usman Latif
@, Arif Ghafoor
#  
 
  
#CERIAS and School of Electrical and Computer Engineering,  
@CERIAS and Department of Computer Science, 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA 
{joshij, ghafoor}@ecn.purdue.edu,  
usman@purdue.edu 
*Dipartimento di Scienze dell’ Informazione, Universita’ di Milano,  
Milano, Italy 
berino@dsi.unimi.it 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A  temporal  RBAC  (TRBAC)  model  has  recently  been  proposed  that  addresses  the  temporal 
aspects of roles and trigger-based role enabling. However, it is limited to constraints on enabling 
of roles only. We propose a Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control model (GTRBAC) 
that is capable of expressing a wider range of temporal constraints. GTRBAC is capable of 
expressing periodic as well as duration constraints on roles, user-role assignments and role-
permission assignments. In GTRBAC, temporal constraints on role enablings and role activations 
can be separately specified. A user-activated role can further be restricted to various activation 
constraints  such  as  cardinality  constraint  or  maximum  active  duration  constraint  within  a 
specified interval. The GTRBAC model extends the syntactic structure of TRBAC model and its 
event and trigger expressions subsume those of TRBAC. 
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1 Introduction 
Role  based  access  control  (RBAC)  models  have  generated  great  interest  in  the  security 
community as a powerful and generalized approach to security [2, 13, 16, 18, 19]. In RBAC, 
users are assigned memberships to roles and these roles are in turn assigned permissions. A user 
can acquire all the permissions of a role of which he is a member. RBAC approach naturally fits 
into an organizational context as users are assigned to organizational roles that have well-defined 
responsibilities and are used to define access control requirements of the organization [7]. RBAC 
models have been shown to be policy-neutral [16, 17, 20], and can be used to express a very wide 
range  of  security  policies  including  discretionary  and  mandatory,  as  well  as  user-defined  or 
organizational specific policies [14]. Many benefits of an RBAC approach include its support for 
security management and the principle of least privilege [20]. For example, we can easily manage 
a change in a user’s responsibility or role within his organization by assigning him the new role 
and removing him from the old one. Furthermore, use of role hierarchies and grouping of objects 
into  object  classes  based  on  responsibility  associated  with  a  role  makes  the  management  of 
permissions very easy. By configuring the assignment of the least set of privileges from a role set 
assigned to a user when he activates the role, inadvertent damage can be minimized in a system. 
Because  of  its  relevance  and  above-mentioned  benefits  it  provides,  RBAC  has  been  widely 
investigated and several extensions to it have been proposed [2, 8, 13, 16, 18, 19]. Although 
RBAC  has  today  reached  a  good  level  of  maturity,  there  are  still  relevant  application 
requirements not addressed by current RBAC models. One such requirement is related to the 
temporal dimension that roles may have. In many organizations, functions may have limited or 
periodic temporal duration. Consider, for instance, the case of a part-time staff in a company and 
assume that any part-time staff is to be authorized to work within the company only on working 
days between 9 AM and 1 PM. If a part-time staff is represented by a role, enforcing such a 
requirement entails making sure that users log in under such a role only during the specified 
temporal intervals. A way to support such a requirement is to specify times when the role can be 
enabled so that a legitimate user can activate it. Roles can thus be enabled at certain time periods 
and disabled at others. Additionally, the part-time role may need to be further restricted to only 
two hours of active time in one session. Furthermore, depending upon organizational needs, the 
number of part-time staff that can activate the role during the daytime may need to be different 
from the number of part-time staff needed during night. 
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Bertino at. el. [5] have recently proposed Temporal-RBAC (TRBAC) that addresses some of the 
temporal issues related to RBAC. TRBAC is an extension of the RBAC model that is able to 
support temporal constraints on roles, particularly role enabling. The main features it provides 
include  the  periodic  enabling/disabling  of  roles  and  temporal  dependencies  among  them 
expressed by means of role triggers, which are active rules that are automatically executed based 
on the enabling and/or disabling of roles. Priorities are associated with both the triggers and 
periodic  enabling/disabling  of  roles  to  handle  possible  conflicts  that  can  arise,  when  the 
simultaneous enabling/disabling of a role is required. In such cases, a combination of priority and 
denials-take-precedence  rule  are  used  to  resolve  the  conflicts.  TRBAC  further  allows  an 
administrator to issue run-time requests for enabling and disabling a role and restricted handling 
of role activations by a user. The model, however, is not able to handle several useful temporal 
constraints. In particular, 
1.  TRBAC does not include temporal constraints on user-role and role-permission assignments. 
It thus assumes that only roles can be transient, i.e., only they are enabled and disabled at 
different time intervals. In this paper, we show that in some applications, roles are more static 
in that they are enabled at all times, and users and permissions assigned to them are transient 
instead. 
2.  TRBAC only handles the temporal constraints on role enabling and does not include any 
constraints on the actual activations of roles by users. Thus, TRBAC does not use a well-
defined, separate notion of role enabling and role activation. Because of this, TRBAC cannot 
handle many constraints that are related to the activations of a role such as the constraints on 
the maximum active duration allowed to a user, the maximum number of activations of a role 
by the same user within a particular interval of time, etc. Although TRBAC has a limited 
capability of restricting a user from activating a role, it is only handled as a run-time request 
that an administrator makes. 
3.  As TRBAC does not consider duration constraints and constraints on actual activations of 
roles, it does not include the notion of enabling and disabling of constraints. As activation 
constraints need to be well defined with respect to the enabled time of a role, we introduce 
the notion of constraint enabling/disabling in this paper. 
A closely related work is the recently proposed constraint specification language called RCL2000 
by Ahn et. al. [1]. However, they do not incorporate the temporal constraints in their specification   3
language. They also do not model the separate notions of role enabling and role activations that is 
essential for separately handling static and dynamic constraints. 
In this paper, we illustrate that the constraints mentioned above are useful for several reasons and 
a complete TRBAC model should allow them. We propose a Generalized TRBAC (GTRBAC) 
model that subsumes TRBAC and can handle all the constraints mentioned above. We distinguish 
between the notions of role activation from that of role enabling to incorporate various activation 
constraints on role activations. We also extend the safety notion and the system architecture 
introduced in [5] to establish the applicability of our model.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we introduce the notion of periodic expressions 
and  general  background  on  the  RBAC  model.  Section  three  presents  the  description  of  the 
temporal constraints. These are syntactically and semantically formalized in section four where 
we  introduce  the  GTRBAC  model.  Additionally,  we  introduce  the  notion  of  safe  temporal 
constraints and activation base (TCAB) as an extension of safe role activation base (RAB) of [5]. 
In section five, we present the system architecture for implementing a GTRBAC system. We 
discuss related work in section six and present our conclusions and future work in section seven. 
2 Preliminaries 
In this section, we provide a brief background on the RBAC model we refer to in this paper. 
2.1 RBAC Model 
The RBAC model as proposed by Sandhu et. al. in [20] consists of the following four basic 
components: a set of users Users, a set of roles Roles, a set of permissions Permissions, 
and a set of sessions Sessions. A user is a human being or an autonomous agent. A role is a 
collection of permissions needed to perform a certain job function within an organization. A 
permission is an access mode that can be exercised on objects in the system and a session relates 
a user to possibly many roles. When a user logs in the system he establishes a session and, during 
the session, he can request to activate some subset of roles he is authorized to play. An activation 
request is granted only if the corresponding role is enabled at the time of the request and the user 
is entitled to activate the role at that time. If the activation request is satisfied, the user issuing the 
request obtains all the permissions associated with the role he has requested to activate. On the 
sets Users, Roles, Permissions, and Sessions, several functions are defined. The 
user  role  assignment  (UA)  and  the  role  permission  assignment  (PA)  functions  model  the   4
assignment of users to roles and the assignment of permissions to roles respectively.  A user can 
be a member of many roles and a role can have many members. Moreover, a role can have many 
permissions and the same permissions can be associated with many roles. The user function maps 
each session to a single user, whereas function role establishes a mapping between a session and 
a set of roles (that is, the roles which are activated by the corresponding user in the session). On 
Roles,  a  hierarchy  is  defined,  denoted  by  ³.  If  ri  ³  rj,  ri,  rj  Î  Roles  then  ri  inherits  the 
permissions of rj. In such a case, ri is a senior role and rj a junior role. The following definition 
formalizes the above discussion. 
Definition 2.1.1 (RBAC Model) [5] The RBAC model consists of the following components: 
·  Sets Users, Roles Permissions and Sessions representing the set of users, 
roles, permissions, and sessions, respectively; 
·  PA:  Roles  ®  Permissions,  the  permission  assignment  function,  that  assigns 
permissions to roles; 
·  UA: Users ® Roles, the user assignment function, that assigns users to roles; 
·  user: Sessions ® Users, which maps each session to a single user; 
·  role: Sessions ® 2
Roles that maps each session to a set of roles; 
·  RH Í Roles ´ Roles, a partially ordered role hierarchy (written ³).   
2.2 Periodic Expression  
Periodic time is represented by means of a symbolic, user-friendly formalism [11, 3]. Under such 
formalism  periodic  time  is  represented  by  pairs  á[begin,  end],  Pñ,  where  P  is  a  periodic 
expression denoting an infinite set of periodic time instants, and [begin, end] is a time interval 
denoting the lower and upper bounds that are imposed on instants in P. 
The formalism for periodic expressions is based on the one proposed in [11], and relies on the 
notion of calendars. A calendar is defined as a countable set of contiguous intervals,
1 numbered 
by integers called indexes of the intervals. 
A subcalendar relationship can be established between calendars. Given two calendars C1 and C2, 
we say that C1 is a subcalendar of C2, (written C1   C2), if each interval of C2 is exactly covered 
by a finite number of intervals of C1. New calendars can be dynamically generated from the 
                                                 
1 Two intervals are contiguous if they can be collapsed into a single one (e.g., [1, 2] and [3, 4]).    5
existing ones, by means of a function generate() (cf. 3] for a formal definition), a reference time 
instant, and a basic calendar (the tick of the system), denoted by t. In the following, we assume 
the existence of a set of calendars containing the calendars Hours, Days, Weeks, Months, and 
Years, where Hours is the calendar with the finest granularity, i.e., it is the basic calendar. 
Calendars can be combined to represent more general periodic expressions, denoting periodic 
instants not necessarily contiguous, like, for instance, the set of Mondays or the set of the third 
hour of the first day of each month. Periodic expressions are formally defined as follows. 
Definition 2.2.1 (Periodic Expression) [3]: Given calendars Cd, C1, …, Cn, a periodic expression 
P is defined as: 
P = å
=
n
i 1
Oi.Ci     x.Cd  
where O1 = all, Oi Î 2  È{all}, Ci   Ci-1 for i = 2,.., n, Cd   Cn, and x Î    
Symbol   separates the first part of the periodic expression that identifies the set of starting 
points of the intervals it represents, from the specification of the duration of each interval in terms 
of  calendar  Cd.  For  example,  all.Years  +  {3,  7}.Months    2.Months  represents  the  set  of 
intervals starting at the same instant as the third and seventh month of every year, and having a 
duration of 2 months. In practice, Oi is omitted when its value is all, whereas it is represented by 
its unique element when it is a singleton. x.Cd is omitted when it is equal to 1.Cn. 
The infinite set of time instants corresponding to a periodic expression P is denoted by Õ(P). 
Function Õ(P) is formally defined as follows. 
Definition 2.2.2 (Function Õ()) [3]: Let P =å
=
n
i 1
 Oi.Ci    x.Cd be a periodic expression, then 
Õ(P) is a set of time intervals whose common duration is Cd, and whose set S of starting points is 
computed as follows: 
·  If n=1, S contains all the starting points of the intervals of calendar C1.  
·  If n>1,  and  On  =  {n1,  ..  ,  nk}, then  S contains the starting  points of  the  n1
th,...,  nk
th  
intervals  (all  intervals  if  On  =  all)  of  calendar  Cn  included  in  each  interval  of 
Õ(å
=
n
i 1
Oi.Ci    1.Cn-1 ).       6
For simplicity, in this paper the bounds begin and end constraining a periodic expression will 
be  denoted  by  a  pair  of  date  expressions  of  the  form  mm/dd/yyyy:hh,  with  the  obvious 
intended meaning; end can also be µ. For instance, [1/1/2001,12/31/2001] denotes all the 
instants in 2001. The set of time instants denoted by á[begin,end], Pñ is defined through the 
use of function Sol(), formally defined as follows. 
Definition 2.2.3 (Function Sol())[3]: Let t be a time instant, P a periodic expression, and begin 
and end two date expressions. Define t Î Sol([begin, end], P) iff there exists t Î Õ (P) such 
that t Ît, tb £ t £ te , where tb and te are the instants denoted by begin and end, respectively.   
3 Temporal constraints and Role States   
In this section, we discuss various types of temporal constraints relevant to role-based systems. In 
particular, we show how temporal constraints can be meaningfully applied to various components 
of an RBAC system by means of examples from various real world applications. Our temporal 
constraint model is quite articulated and provides both duration and periodicity constraints as well 
as other forms of specialized cardinality constraints.  
A key aspect of our RBAC model, which is a natural consequence of the introduction of temporal 
constraints, is the distinction between the notions of role enabling and role activation. Such a 
distinction leads in turn to the notion of states of a role. In our model, a role can be in one of the 
three states at any time as shown in Figure 1.  A Disabled state of a role indicates that the role 
cannot be used in any user session, i.e., a user cannot acquire the permissions associated with the 
role. A role in the Disabled state can be enabled. The Enabled state indicates that users who are 
entitled to use the role at the time of the request may activate the role, but no one has yet done so. 
If a user now activates the role, the state of the role becomes Active. When a role is in Active 
state, it indicates that there is at least one user who has activated the role. Once in Active state, 
upon any subsequent activation by the same or other users, the role remains in the Active state. 
When the role is in Active state, then upon deactivation, the role goes into the Disabled state if 
there is only one session in which it is active, otherwise it remains in the Active state. A role in 
Enabled or Active state goes into the Disabled state if a disabling event arises.    7
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In the remainder of this section, we first discuss the two forms of temporal constraints provided 
by  our  model  and  illustrate  the  use  of  such  constraints.  We  then  introduce  the  specialized 
activation  cardinality  constraints,  provided  by  our  model,  whose  purpose  is  to  support  fine-
grained control on role activation/deactivation. 
3.2 Periodicity/Duration constraints 
An  important  feature  of  our  model  is  that  periodicity/duration  constraints  can  be  applied  to 
various  components  of  RBAC.  Specifically,  they  can  be  applied  to  roles  themselves,  by 
constraining the times when roles are enabled or active, and to user-role and role-permission 
assignments. User-role assignments refer to the permissions given to users to play roles, whereas 
role-permission  assignments  refer  to  the  grants  given  to  roles  for  accessing  the  protected 
resources. Role enablings as well as assignments can be restricted to particular intervals or for a 
specified duration  depending  on  requirements.  Similarly,  role  activations  can be  restricted to 
duration constraints. Since a role activation is the result of granting a user request to activate the 
role, we do not allow periodicity constraint on role activations, as such a request is made at the 
discretion of the user. Periodic expressions can be used to specify start and end times between 
which  a  role  can  be  enabled,  or  an  assignment  granted.  Duration  constraints,  however,  only 
specify the length of time that a role can be enabled or activated, or an assignment granted, and 
do not specify start and end times, and hence such constraints come to effect only if some other 
events or conditions trigger them.  
Figure 1. States of a role   8
In our model, we further refine duration constraints on role activations into two types: total active 
duration constraints and maximum duration per activation constraints. 
1.  Total active duration constraint: The total active duration of any role may need to be 
restricted in some cases. This notion is similar to that of the total time associated with a 
calling card. After the users have utilized the specified total active duration for a role, it 
cannot be activated again, even though it may still be enabled. Furthermore, the total active 
duration specified may span a number of periods of role enabling and disabling. We further 
classify total active duration constraint into: 
Per role: This restricts the total active duration for a role, irrespective of who the users are. 
Once the sum of all activations of the role reaches the maximum allowed value, no further 
user activation of the role is allowed. 
Per user-role:  This restricts the total active duration for a role by a particular user. After the 
specified user uses the total active duration of the role specified for him/her, only s/he is not 
allowed to activate the role further. 
2.  Maximum  duration  constraint  per  activation:  This  constraint  restricts  the  total 
maximum duration allowed for each activation of a role. This notion is similar to limiting of 
car parking to a fixed number of hours at one time. Once the maximum active duration 
allowed expires for a user, the role activation for that user is removed. However, there may 
still be other activations of the same role in the system, including one by the same user in 
some other session. This constraint can also be per role or per user role.  
Per role: This restricts the maximum active duration for each activation of a role for any user, 
i.e., any user assigned to the role can acquire the permissions of the role for the specified 
maximum duration in one activation, unless there is a per user-role constraint specified for 
the user. 
Per user-role:  This restricts the maximum active duration allowed for each activation of a 
role by a particular user. Whenever the specified user activates the role, he is allowed only 
the specified maximum duration. 
We  now  present  various  examples  illustrating  the  use  of  such  constraints  in  the  various 
components of an RBAC model.   9
Examples of Periodicity/Duration constraints on user-role assignment 
Some roles are often more static than others in that they can be enabled most of the time, whereas 
users come and go. In such cases, the users assigned to the role may need to be constrained by 
restricting how long or in which intervals they can use the role, as illustrated by the following 
example. 
Example 3.1 (Automated Hospital): Consider a fully automated hospital where access to 
doors, computer terminals in various wards, elevators, TV/Movie programs, etc. are controlled 
by using GTRBAC system. For example, to enter a corridor, a patient needs to activate his role 
at the door. We consider the following three roles a patient may be assigned to at the time he is 
admitted:  Delivery_Patient,  Cardiac_Patient  and  Virus_Related_Patient.  Using  these 
roles,  permissions  to  open  certain  doors  and  elevators  can  be  restricted  so  that  a 
Delivery_Patient  do  not  inadvertently  run  over  a  Virus_Related_Patient.  Similarly  a 
Cardiac_Patient can be restricted to watch only certain TV channels or movies so that the 
programs  do  not exert  unnecessary/unhealthy  stress  on  him.  These roles are always  in the 
enabled state to allow patients to be admitted at any time so long as there are rooms or beds 
available.  When a patient is admitted, s/he is assigned to one of these roles for a projected 
period of stay. Some other roles in the system include NurseOnDayDuty, NurseInTraining, 
etc. 
In the automated hospital example, we can identify the following two constraints on the user-role 
assignments: 
1.  Periodicity constraint: The patient assignment may informally state that ‘Mary is assigned 
to Delivery_Patient role in interval [12/1/2001, 12/20/2001]’. Within the specified interval, 
Mary can use Delivery_Patient role to do all permitted accesses inside the hospital. 
2.  Duration  constraint:  A  part-time  nurse,  say  Mary,  may  be  assigned  to  the 
NurseOnDayDuty role for 3 hours on each workday after a particular nurse, say Cathy, has 
activated  the  NurseOnDayDuty  role  that  day.  Here,  once  Cathy  activates  the 
NurseOnDayDuty role, then Mary can assume the same role for three hours, although it is 
not mandatory. 
Examples of Periodicity/Duration constraint on role enabling 
Some meaningful examples of constraints from the automated hospital are as follows.   10
1.  Periodicity constraint: Role NurseOnDayDuty must be enabled only from 9am to 9pm. A 
user  who  is  assigned  to  this  role  can  activate  it  at  any  time  within  the  specified  period 
provided s/he is not constrained by other temporal constraint.  
2.  Duration constraint: Role NurseInTraining may need to be enabled for 3 hours after a 
particular nurse, say Cathy, has activated the role NurseOnDayDuty. Anyone assigned to 
the NurseInTraining role may then activate it. 
Examples of Periodicity/Duration constraint on role-permission assignment 
Consider the following example of an online course. 
Example  3.2  (Online  Course):  A  professor  offers  an  online  course  on  ‘Computer 
Security’. He creates a role called CSRegistrant as shown in Figure 2. He divides the online 
course material into three sections –  
1.  Lectures: There are n lectures as depicted in Figure 2 - Lecture 1, Lecture 2 .., Lecture n. 
The permission set related to the i
th lecture is represented as PLi.  
2.  Home  works:  There  are  n  homework  assignments  (shown  as  HW1,..,HWn) 
corresponding  to  n  lectures.  The  permission  set  associated  with  the  i
th  homework 
assignment is PHWi. 
3.  Homework solutions: There are n homework solutions (shown as HWSol1,…,HWSoln) 
corresponding to the n homework assignments. The permission set associated with the i
th 
homework solution is PHWi. 
The course starts on the date startdate and ends on enddate. The course duration is (n+2) 
weeks – n lectures for n weeks and 2 remaining weeks for reviews and exams. The professor 
uses the following three rules to control access to the different sections: 
Rule 1: The i
th lecture is made available to students on the start of the i
th week of the 
course (say Monday) and is made accessible till the end of the course. 
In the graphical representation, the arcs between the role and permission-sets are labeled as 
(x, y), where x denotes the date on which the associated permission set is assigned to the role, 
and y denotes the date on which the permissions are de-assigned from the role. For example, 
based on Rule 1, the permission set PL1 is associated with the arc label (startdate, enddate), 
indicating that the permissions in PL1 are assigned to CSRegistrant role on startdate and   11
removed from it on enddate. Similarly, permissions in PL2 are assigned to CSRegistrant 
role  in  the  interval  (startdate  +  1  week,  enddate),  which  says  that  the  permissions  are 
assigned to the role one week after the course starts, i.e., in the beginning of the 2
nd week. We 
note that for each lecture, once the permissions are assigned to the role, they are not de-
assigned until the end of the course. For homework assignments, he uses the following rules:  
Rule 2a: Three days after the start of a weekly lecture, the corresponding homework 
assignment will be made accessible to the students.  
Rule 2b: One week after the end of the i
th lecture, the i
th homework assignments will be 
removed (i.e., is made inaccessible). 
Lecture 1 (PL1)
Lecture 2 (PL2)
Lecture n (PLn)
HW 1 (PHW1)
HW 2 (PHW2)
HW n (PHWn)
HWSol 1 (PHWSol1)
HWSol 2 (PHWSol2)
HWSol n (PHWSoln)
CSRegistrant
(startdate, enddate)
(startdate + 1 week, enddate)
(startdate + (n-1) week, enddate)
(startdate + 3 days, startdate + 2 weeks)
(startdate + 10 days, startdate + 3 weeks)
(startdate + (7.(n-1)+3) days, startdate + 2 weeks)
(startdate + 2 weeks, enddate)
(startdate + 3 weeks, enddate)
(startdate + (n+1) weeks, enddate)
Students
Assigned to
CSRegistrant
role
Intervals in which permissions 
are assigned to CSRegistrant
Lectures
Homework
Assignments
Homework
Solutions
 
Figure 2. Online Course Example (Role-Permission assignment) 
Whereas Rule 2a seems reasonable, Rule 2b might appear unnecessary. Here, we assume that 
with  each  assignment  there  is  a  particular  submission  procedure  to  be  followed,  which 
involves executing various programs. We can assume that the PHW1 contains permissions 
related to executing these required programs for the submission process too. Now consider   12
the arc for PHW1 , which is (startdate + 3 days, startdate + 2 weeks). As the first lecture 
begins on startdate, PHW1 should be accessible to the students on (startdate + 3 days) as per 
Rule 2a. Again, the first lecture ends on (startdate + 1 week) and hence the permissions in 
PHW1 are removed on startdate + 2 weeks, i.e. 1 week after the end of the corresponding 
lecture. 
The rule corresponding to the homework solutions is:  
Rule  3:  when  a  homework  assignment  is  removed  as  in  rule  2b  above,  then  the 
corresponding solution is posted and it is made available till the end of the course. 
For example, consider the arc for PHWSol1, i.e., (startdate+2 weeks, enddate). As the first 
homework assignment is removed on (startdate + 2 weeks), its solution PHWSol1 is assigned 
to CSRegistrant role on (startdate + 2 weeks). As the arc shows, PHWSol1 is de-assigned 
from the role on enddate. 
The example illustrates an efficient use of temporal-constraint on role-permission assignment to 
enforce the access policy defined by the three rules. We see that the course access policy can be 
expressed  by  using  periodicity  constraints  on  role-permission  assignments.  Some  of  the 
periodicity constraints can also be specified as duration constraints. For example, we can have a 
duration  constraint  on  the  assignment  of  PHW1  to  the  CSRegistrant  role  as  –  “PHW1  is 
assigned to role for a duration (2 weeks – 2)”. Then we can trigger this assignment on the third 
day, after PL1 is assigned to the role. 
Examples of Duration constraint on role activation 
Consider the following example of a video library. 
Example 3.3 (Video Library): A user, say John, subscribes to a video library (VL) so that he 
is  allowed  6  hours  of  movie  time  per  week.  The VL  administrator  assigns  John  to  a  role 
MovieViewer. The MovieViewer role is assigned a total of 600 hrs per week of total activation 
time and each user is allowed a maximum of 6 hrs/week out of that. Another user, say Mary, 
wants 10 hrs per week of time.  In that case the VL administrator can assign Mary to the 
MovieViewer role and further specify that she be restricted to a maximum of 10 hrs/week of 
active  time.  For  finer  control  over  resource  use,  the  VL  administrator  further  employs  a 
constraint that says each user can activate the MovieViewer role for at most 2 hours in each 
activation. Further, upon John’s request the VL administrator adds yet another restriction that 
John be allowed to activate the role for maximum of 3 hours in each activation.   13
The example illustrates the following types of temporal constraints on the activation period of a 
role within a specified interval: 
1.  Total  active  duration  constraint:  The  600  hour-duration  per  week  allowed  for  the 
MovieViewer role is a constraint on the total active duration of the role, whereas the total of 
6 hrs per week allowed to individual users is a restriction per user. In particular, note that no 
matter who uses the MovieViewer role, once the sum total of durations of all its activations 
exceeds 600 hours, it can no longer be used by any user for the remaining part of the week. 
When the new week begins, it will again have 600 hours as total activation time. The 10 
hrs/week restriction for Mary is a per-user-role constraint. 
2.  Maximum duration constraint per activation: The additional restriction that each user can 
activate  the  MovieViewer  role  for  2  hours  in  each  activation  of  the  role  is  a  per-role 
maximum duration constraint. Similarly, the restriction of maximum of 3 hours activation 
time for John each time he activates the role is a per-user-role constraint. Since, John has 6 
hrs/week of active time, he needs to have at least two activations of MovieViewer role each 
week in order to fully use the 6 hrs/week time allowed to him. Similarly, since Mary has total 
of 10 hours per week, she has to activate the MovieViewer role atleast 5 times (2 hours per 
activation) in order to utilize all 10 hours of time. 
3.3 Activation Cardinality Constraints 
The number of activations of any role may need to be restricted to control access to critical 
objects or resources in some applications. For example, depending on the capability of the video 
servers,  the  MovieViewer  role  in  Example  3.3  may  need  to  be  limited  to  a  specified 
maximum number of concurrent activations at any time. Furthermore, we may want to constrain 
the number of concurrent activations of the MovieViewer role by each user to prevent one person 
accessing all the resources while others are denied access, thus preventing denial of service. In 
our model, we further classify activation cardinality constraints into:  
3.  Total n activations constraint: In a given period of time, a role may be limited to n total 
activations. This includes overlapping or non-overlapping activations. This can be of two 
types: 
Per role: This constraint allows at most n activations of a role in a given period of time. The 
activations of a role may be associated with the same or different users. The role may be 
enabled and disabled a number of times before the total number of activations of the role 
allowed is reached, after which the role cannot be activated.   14
Per user-role:  This constraint restricts a total of n activations of a role by a particular user. 
Each user may be specified to have a different cardinality restriction. 
4.  Maximum n concurrent activations constraint: A role may be restricted to n concurrent 
activations at any time. This may also be of two types: 
Per role: This restricts the number of concurrent activations of a role to a maximum number. 
The activation of these roles may be associated with the same or a set of different users. 
Per user-role:  This restricts the total of concurrent activations of a role by a particular user to 
a given number. Different users may be allowed different number of concurrent activations of 
the same role. 
4 Generalized TRBAC 
In this section, we present the formal framework for a GTRBAC that can handle the constraints 
discussed in Section 3. We present the syntax and semantics of the expressions we use to specify 
various GTRBAC constraints. 
4.1 Syntax  
In this subsection, we introduce the syntax of our constraint language, so to formally define all 
components of constraints. We also introduce the notion of run-time requests. Run-time requests 
are necessary in order to model activation of roles by a valid user, which is done at his/her 
discretion.  Furthermore,  a  security  administrator  may  need  to  enable  or  disable  roles  and 
assign/de-assign users or permissions to roles at run-time. Such events are modeled as run-time 
requests  that  may  or  may  not  be  granted  depending  upon  the  existing  constraints.  Before 
introducing  the  syntax,  we  introduce  some  basic  event  expressions  used  by  the  constraint 
language. 
We use (Prios,  ) as a totally ordered set of priorities and assume that Prios contains two 
distinct elements ^ and  such that, for all x Î Prios, ^  x  . We write x  y, if  x  y and 
x ¹ y.  
Definition  4.1.1  (Event  Expressions,  Role  Status  Expressions  and  Assignment  Status 
Expressions) 
1.  A simple event expression has one of the following forms: 
a.  enable r or disable r where r Î Roles, where r Î Roles.  
b.  assignU r to u or de-assignU r to u, where r Î Roles and  u Î Users.   15
c.  assignP p to r or de-assignP p to r,  where  p Î Permissions and r Î 
Roles. 
d.  enable c or  disable c, where c is a duration constraint expressed as (D, Dx, pr:E) 
or activation constraints of form (C) and (D, C). These constraints are elaborated in 
Table 1 and discussed below. 
2.  Prioritized event expressions have the form pr:E, where pr Î Prios and E is a simple event 
expression; 
3.  Role status expressions have one of the following forms: 
a.  enabled r or Øenabled r (or disabled r), where r Î Roles. 
b.  active r for u or Øactive r for u , where r Î Roles and  u Î Users. 
4.  Assignment status expressions have the following forms 
a.  assigned r to u or Øassigned r to u, where r Î Roles and  u Î Users. 
b.  assigned  p  to  r  or  Øassigned  p  to  r,  where  r  Î  Roles  and    p  Î 
Permissions.   
Users can activate an enabled role if they are entitled to do so by valid assignments. A user makes 
a request for activation of a role at run-time within a user session. S/he may activate the same role  
in several user sessions concurrently if permitted by activation constraints.  The system must 
ensure that activation constraints are satisfied before granting a user request for activating a role 
and for all instants at which the role activation is associated with a user.  An administrator may 
also need to activate an event at run-time. We define run-time requests that model these two types 
of events as follows. 
Definition 4.1.2 (Run-time request): A run-time request expression has one of the following 
forms: 
1.  a user’s run-time request expression to activate a role has the form: 
s: activate r for u after ¨t,  or 
s: deactivate r for u after ¨t 
where r Î Roles and  u Î Users, s is the session attached to the request, and ¨t is 
the duration. The priority of this event is assumed to be   
2.  an administrator' s run-time request expression  has the form: 
pr:E after ¨t          16
where pr:E is a prioritized event expression and ¨t is the duration expression. The 
priority and the delay expressions can be omitted, in which case, by default pr =  
and ¨t = 0.   
A relevant requirement in many application domains is represented by the need of automatically 
executing certain actions, such as the enabling or disabling of a role, upon occurrence of an event. 
Certain events are thus result of occurrences of other events. In our model, we provide the notion 
of trigger, defined below, in order to support such event dependencies.  
 
Definition 4.1.3 (Triggers): A trigger expression has the form 
E1 ,…, En , C1 ,…, Ck ®  pr:E after ¨t        
where Eis are simple event expressions or run time requests, Cis are role status expressions or  
assignment status expressions, pr:E is a prioritized event expression with pr , E is a simple 
expression such that E Ï {s:activate r for u}, and ¨t is a duration expression.   
We note that, because an activation request is made at a user’s discretion, we do not allow event 
expression “s:activate r for u” to appear in the head of a trigger. However, such an event 
can trigger other events and hence can be a part of the body of a trigger. We also note that the 
event “s:de-activate r for u” is allowed to appear in the head of a trigger as it can be used 
to enforce system controls. 
Based  on  the  definitions  of  prioritized  events,  run-time  requests  and  trigger  expressions 
introduced above, we obtain the complete set of constraint expressions as shown in Table 1. 
The description of the syntax of these expressions follows next. 
The periodicity constraint expressions have the general form (I, P, pr:E). The pair (I,P) specifies 
the  intervals  in  which  the  event  E  takes  place.  E  can  be  a  role  enabling  event 
“enable/disable r”or either of the assignment events “assignU/deassignU p to r” 
and “assignP/deassignP p to r”. 
Figure 3 shows periodicity constraints on user-role assignments. The two grayed thick lines at the 
bottom represent the intervals (t3, t6) and (t8, t11) in which role r is enabled. The thick dark lines 
are intervals in which users are assigned to role r. The dotted portions of the thick dark lines 
indicate the valid user assignment periods that are ineffective because the role is disabled at those   17
intervals. For example, user u1 is assigned to role r in interval (t1, t5). However, user u1 can only 
activate role r in the interval (t3, t5), as the role is disabled in the remaining part of interval (t1, t5). 
Table 1. Constraint Expressions 
Constraint 
categories 
Constraints  Expression  Set/Type 
User-role assignment  (I, P, pr:assignU/deassignU r to u)   CURp 
Role enabling  (I, P, pr:enable/disable r)  CRp 
Periodicity 
Constraint 
Role-permission assignment  (I, P, pr:assignP/deassignP p to r)  CPRp 
User-role assignment  ([(I, P)| D], DU, pr:assignU/deassignU r  to u)  CUrd 
Role enabling  ([(I, P)| D], DR, pr:enable/disable r )  CRd 
Duration 
Constraints 
Role-permission assignment  ([(I, P)| D], DP, pr:assignP/deassignP p to r)  CPRd 
Per-role  ([(I, P)| D], Dactive, [Ddefault], activeR_total r)  C
a
dr  Total active role 
duration  Per-user-role  ([(I, P)| D], Duactive, u, activeUR_total r)  C
a
dur 
Per-role  ([(I, P)| D], Dmax, activeR_max r )  C
a
mr 
Duration 
Constraints on 
Role Activation  Max role duration per 
activation  Per-user-role  ([(I, P)| D], Dumax, u, activeUR_max r)  C
a
mur 
Per-role  ([(I, P)| D], Nactive, [Ndefault], activeR_n r )  C
a
nr  Total no. of activations 
Per-user-role  ([(I, P)| D], Nuactive, u, activeUR_n r)  C
a
nur 
Per-role  ([(I, P)| D], Nmax, [Ndefault], activeR_con r)  C
a
nnr 
Cardinality 
Constraint on 
Role Activation  Max. no. of concurrent 
activations  Per-user-role  ([(I, P)| D], Numax, u, activeUR_con r)  C
a
nmur 
Trigger  E1 ,…, En , C1 ,…, Ck     ®  pr:E after 
￿
t  Ctr 
Constraint 
Enabling 
pr:enable/disable c 
 where c Î{(D, Dx, pr:E), (C) , (D, C)} 
Cc 
Users’ activation request  (s:(de)activate r  for u after 
￿
t))  Cu 
(pr:assignU/de-assignU r to u after 
￿
t)  Cadmin 
(pr:enable/disable r after 
￿
t)  Cadmin 
(pr:assignP/de-assignP p to r after 
￿
t)  Cadmin 
 
Run-time 
Requests 
 
 
Administrator’s run-time request 
(pr:enable/disable c after 
￿
t)  Cadmin 
u1
u2
u3
u4
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t10 t11 t12
Role r is enabled in intervals (t3, t6) and (t8, t11). 
User u1 is assigned to r in interval (t1, t5) but can use r only in interval (t3, t5).
User u2 is assigned to r in interval (t4, t10) but can use r only in intervals (t4, t6) and (t8, t10).
User u3 is assigned to r in interval (t2, t7) but can use r only in interval (t3, t6).
User u4 is assigned to r in interval (t2, t12) and can use r whenever it is enabled.
s1
s2
s3
s4
 
The general form for the duration constraint expressions for role enabling and assignments is ([(I, 
P,)|D], Dx, pr:E), where x is R,U or P, corresponding to the three types of possible events:  
“enable/disable r”, “assignU/deassignU p to r” and “assignP/deassignP p 
Figure 3. Periodicity constraint on user-role assignment   18
to r”. The symbol “|” between (I, P) and D indicates that either (I, P) or D is specified. The 
square bracket in [(I, P,)|D] implies that it is an optional parameter. Hence, we have the following 
three forms of duration constraints: (I, P, Dx, pr:E), (D, Dx, pr:E) and (Dx, pr:E).  
The form (I, P, Dx, pr:E) indicates that the event E is valid for the duration Dx within each valid 
periodic interval specified by (I, P). The form (Dx, pr:E) implies that the constraint is valid at all 
times. Thus, at any time, if event E is caused then it is restricted by duration Dx. The constraint c 
= (D, Dx, pr:E) implies that there is a valid duration D within which the duration restriction Dx 
applies on event E. In other words, the constraint c needs to be enabled for duration D. To support 
enabling of such constraints (and activation constraints discussed later) we include the constraint 
enabling  expressions  as  shown  in  Table  1.  The  constraint  enabling/disabling  event  has  the 
expression  “enable/disable  c”,  where  c  is  a  constraint  expression  (D,  Dx,  pr:E).  A 
constraint enabling event may be a run-time request or a triggered event. 
Activation constraints have the general form ([(I, P)| D], C), where C represents the restriction 
applied to a role activation; for example, C = (Dactive, [Ddefault], activeR_total r) indicates the 
total active role duration per-role constraint. [(I, P)| D] is an optional parameter and has the same 
meaning as in duration constraints. Thus, an activation constraint may be in one of the three 
forms (I, P, C), (D, C) or (C). The first two forms are similar to those for duration constraints. 
The form (C) implies that the activation restriction specified by C applies within each enabling of 
the associated role. If C is a per-role constraint, it has an optional default parameter that allows 
specifying the default value for the per-user-role restriction. For example, if C = (Dactive, [Ddefault], 
activeR_total r) then Ddefault indicates the default per-user-role active duration value applied to 
all the users assigned to the role, e.g., the 6 hrs/week limit in Example 3.3. If Ddefault is not 
specified then we assume that Dactive = Ddefault, i.e, a single user can use up the entire duration 
Dactive.  As  shown  in  the  table,  parameters  of  other  activation  constraints  can  be  similarly 
interpreted. 
Figure 4 illustrates the three different forms of an activation constraint C, where C is a cardinality 
constraint. In Figure 4(a), we have constraint c = (D, C). A trigger or a run-time request at time t2 
enables this  constraint.    c  is  valid  for  duration  D, which for this  case is the  interval (t2, t5) 
indicated by the dark thick line. However, within interval (t2, t5), there is a subinterval (t3, t4) in 
which role r is not enabled. The cardinality constraint, however, implies that the total number of 
activations of role r in the intervals (t2, t3) and (t4, t5) combined should not exceed Nactive. In 
Figure 4(b), the working of an activation constraint of form c = (I, P, C) is illustrated. Here, (t2,   19
t3) and (t6, t7) are actual intervals in (I, P) and hence, in each of these intervals the total number of 
activations of role r is restricted to Nactive. In Figure 4(c), the constraint of form c = (C) is shown. 
Here, in each enabling period of role r, the constraint is valid. For example, role r is enabled by a 
periodicity constraint in the intervals (t1, t2), (t3, t4) and (t7, t8). In each of these intervals, at the 
most Nactive activations of role r are allowed. Furthermore, role r is also enabled in the interval (t5, 
t6) by a duration constraint. The activation constraint c also applies to this interval and within this 
interval also only Nactive activations of role r are allowed. 
t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t1
c = (I,P, N active, active r -total r)
r enabled
t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t1
c =(D, N active, active r-total r)
enable c
Triggered 
or 
run-tim e
D uration = D
r enabled
Total num ber of activations of r in 
these intervals com bined should be 
less than or equal to N active
Total num ber of activations of r in 
each of these intervals should be 
less than or equal to N active
t8 t7
c = (N active, active r -total r)
r enabled by (I, P, enable r)
The constraint is active at all tim es and is enforced for each enabled period of role r.
Total num ber of activations of r in each of these shaded intervals should be less than or equal to N active
(t2, t3), (t6, t7) Î P (I,P)
r enabled using (D, enable r)
D uration = D
(a) (b)
(c)
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8
t2, t3, t6, t7 Î Sol(I,P)
 
Let the constraint set be:
C1. (7, activeR_n, r),
C2. (4, activeR_con, r),
C3. (2, u2, activeUR_n, r),
C4. (x, u2, activeUR_total, r) and
x = sum {(t2, t11), (t4, t10), (t10, t11)}
t1 t2 t3 t
4
t5 t6 t7 t8 t10 t11 t12
1. In shaded area a, no new activations of r is allowed as the constraint C4 specifies that 
the number of concurrent activations is 4.
2. In shaded portions b and c , there are two concurrent activations of r by u2- in session 
pairs (s2, s4) and (s2, s5). And hence, C3 does not allow any new activation of r by u2.
3. In d, two activations of r can be allowed, as per C1, but, these activations cannot be 
by u2 because at t11, u2 uses its allocated  total activation time as stated in constraint 
C4. 
u3
u1
u2
u2
u2
s1
s2
s3
s4
No new activation of r is allowed here
s5
No new activation of r by u2 is allowed
a
b
c
d
  Figure 5. Activation constraint 
Figure 4. Constraint enabled (a) for a specified duration (b) in specified intervals (c) at all times.   20
An example consisting of a set of activation constraints is depicted in Figure 5.  Remaining 
constraint expressions in the table include run-time requests as per Definition 4.1.2 and triggers as 
per Definition 4.1.3. The last column indicates the names of the sets that contain corresponding 
constraint types, e.g., CURp is the set of all periodicity constraints on user-role assignments. We 
will also use them to represent constraint of certain types, e.g., constraint of type CURp refers to 
the periodicity constraints on user-role assignments. 
The  notion  of  conflicting  events  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  semantics  of  GTRBAC  and  is 
formalized  by  the  following  definition,  which  refers  to  Table  2.  The  table  enlists  all  the 
conflicting pairs of events possible in GTRBAC under columns E1 and E2. A pair of events E1 
and E2 in a row conflict if the corresponding condition C holds. Conflicting events cannot happen 
simultaneously. For example, (a) and (b) indicate that events “disable r” and “enable r” 
conflict with each other. 
  Table 2. Conflicting events 
  E1  E2 = Conf (E1)  Condition (C) 
a.  enable r  disable r’ 
b.  disable r  enable r’ 
 
(r = r’) 
c.  assignU r to u  de-assignU r’ to u’ 
d.  de-assignU r to u  assignU r’ to u’ 
 
(r = r’ and u = u’) 
e.  assignP  p to r  de-assignP p’ to r’ 
f.  de-assignP  p to r  assignP  p’ to r’ 
 
(r = r’ and p = p’) 
g.  s:deactivate r for u    s’:activate r’ for u’  (s = s’, r = r’ and u = u’) 
h.  s’:deactivate r’ for u’  (s = s’, r = r’ and u = u’) 
i.  disable r’  (r = r’) 
j. 
 
s:activate r for u   
  de-assign r’ to u’  (r = r’ and u = u’) 
k.  enable c  disable c’ 
l.  disable c  enable c’ 
 
(c = c’) 
 
Definition 4.1.4 (Conflicting Events): Let E1, E2 be two event expressions. We  say that E2 is a 
conflicting event of E1, written as E2 = Conf (E1), as shown in Table 2, if the corresponding 
condition C holds true.    
In Table 2, (h), (i) and (j) indicate that there are three events that conflict with an activation 
event. We note that the conflicts in (i) and (j) involve different categories of events – activation 
and disabling or de-assignment events. If there is a request for an activation of a role r and at the 
same time, if there is another event attempting to disable r, a conflict results, as both cannot be   21
satisfied simultaneously. Similarly, if there is a user u requesting an activation of role r and at the 
same time there is an event that de-assigns the user u from role r, then both the events cannot 
occur simultaneously. We use priorities and precedence rules to eliminate conflicts. We also note 
that events “enable r ” and “s:deactivate r for u” do not conflict as both can occur 
simultaneously. In this paper, unless otherwise specified explicitly, when we refer to a conflicting 
event of an activation event, we will refer to the conflicting pair (h).  
We refer to the set of all the event expressions, constraints and triggers in a GTRBAC system as 
Temporal Constraint and Activation Base (TCAB).  We define a TCAB as follows. 
Definition  4.1.5  (Temporal  Constraint  and  Activation  Base):  A  Temporal  Constraint  and 
Activation Base (TCAB)  T consists of the following components : 
1.  A set of role enabling and assignment constraints of form (I, P, pr:Es) or ([I,P,|D,], Dx, 
pr:Es), where 
a.  I is a time interval; 
b.  P is a periodic expression; 
c.  Dx is the duration restriction on event Es; 
d.  D is the duration in which the duration restriction specified by Dx applies to Es; 
e.  pr:E is a prioritized event expression with p   . 
2.  A set of activation constraints of the forms ([I,P,|D,] C), i.e., (I, P, C), (D, C) or (C), 
3.  A set of triggers as per Definition 4.1.3.    
In the formalization, the user’s run-time requests and the administrator’s run-time requests are 
modeled as a stream RQ of run-time request expressions. RQ(t) represents the set of run-time 
requests at time t. Here, time points are expressed as integers, starting from 0. 
Definition 4.1.5 (Request Stream) A request stream is a sequence RQ = áRQ(0), RQ(1),…, 
RQ(t), …ñ, where each RQ(t) is a (possibly empty) set of run-time request expressions.   
4.2 Semantics 
GTRBAC, like TRBAC, uses the notion of blocked events to resolve conflicts. When priorities 
cannot resolve conflicts, the model uses negative-takes-precedence principle. By this principle, 
for example, disabling of a role takes precedence over enabling of the role and deactivation of a 
role takes precedence over the activation of the role.    22
Definition 4.2.1 (Blocked Event, Nonblocked) Let S be a set of prioritized event expressions. 
Let pr:E be a  prioritized event expression. We say that pr:E is blocked by S if there exists q Î 
Prios such that (q:Conf(E)) Î S and either 
1.  E Î {enable r, assignU r to u, assignP p to r, s:activate r for u, enable c} and 
p  q, or 
2.  E Î {disable r, de-assignU r to u, de-assignP p to r, s:deactivate r’ for u, 
disable c } and p  q; 
The set of all members of S that is not blocked by S will be denoted by Nonblocked(S).   
We note that the conflict between “disable r” (or de-assignU r to u) and “s:activate 
r for u” does not create any problem as role activation is a low priority event and will always 
be blocked by a role disabling event (or deassignment event). However, as the definition of the 
caused events later shows, care must be taken to ensure that disabling event is not blocked, if it is 
to block an activation event. The following example illustrates the notion of blocked events. 
Example  4.1  Let  S  =  {H:enable  r0,H:disable  r0,VH:enable  r1, 
H:disable  r1}.  Thus,  Nonblocked(S)  =  {H:disable  r0,  VH:enable  r1},  since 
H:enable  r0  is blocked  by  H:disable  r0,  by  the  first  condition  of  Definition  4.2.1 
(which specifies the disable-takes-precedence principle), whereas H:disable r1 is blocked 
by VH:enable r1, by the second condition of Definition 4.2.1 
The  dynamics  of  event  occurrences,  and  various  states  of  role  enablings  and  activations  in 
GTRBAC is represented  as a sequence of snapshots. Each snapshot models the current set of 
prioritized events and the status of role, user-role and role-permission assignments as well as that 
of the activation constraints. To efficiently represent status information within these snapshots, 
we first define the two structures, called respectively as u-snapshot and r-snapshot. 
Definition 4.2.2 (u-snapshot): We define a u-snapshot for user u with respect to a role r as the 
tuple (u, r, dua, nua, dm, nm, Su,, Du), where: 
·  r Î Roles, u Î Users such that u is assigned to r, 
·  dua is the remaining total duration for which u can activate r, 
·  nua is the remaining number of times that u can activate r, 
·  dm is the maximum duration for which u can activate r at one time, 
·  nm is the maximum number of concurrent activations of r that u can have,   23
·  Su = (s1, s2, ... , sk) is the list of sessions in which u is currently using r and Du = (d1, d2, ... 
, dk) is the list of durations of activations of r by u in each of these sessions.  
Definition 4.2.3 (r-snapshot): We define an r-snapshot for a role r as the tuple (r, dra, nra, drm, 
nrm, status, Pr, Ur) where: 
·  r Î Roles,  
·  dra is the remaining total active duration for r,  
·  nra is the remaining total number of activations of r,  
·  drm is the remaining total active duration for r,  
·  nrm is the remaining total number of activations of r,  
·  status Î {enabled, disabled} is the current status of r.  
·  Pr is the set of permissions that are assigned to r. 
·  Ur is the set of u-snapshot such that, for  all ut Î Ur , ut.r
2 = r.   
By using the above structures, we model events, various role and assignment status, and status of 
constraints, by three distinct sequences EV, ST and CT, respectively. We note that activation 
constraints of forms (D, C) and (C) can be active at certain instants of time. To capture this 
semantics, we use CT to maintain such a list of valid activation constraints.  
Definition  4.2.4    (System  Trace)  A  system  trace  -  or  simply  a  trace  –  consists  of  infinite 
sequences of EV, ST and CT, such that for all integers t ³ 0: 
·  the t
th element of EV, denoted as EV(t), is a set of prioritized event expressions; intuitively, 
this is the set of events which occur at time t; 
·  the t
th element of ST, denoted as ST(t), is a set of r-snapshots corresponding to existing roles 
at time t. Algorithm ComputeST in Figure 6 is used to compute ST(t) for each t; and 
·  the t
th element of CT, denoted as CT (t), is a set of activation constraints of forms (C) and (D, 
C) valid  at time t. Algorithm ComputeCT in Figure 8 is used to compute CT(t). 
We assume that a system starts at an initial state where all the roles are disabled and there are no 
user-role assignments, role-permission assignments or valid activation constraints. Such a state 
exists at time t = 0. As the time progresses the events listed in Table 2 take place changing 
various role and assignment status and valid activation constraints. The notion of a GTRBAC 
trace with such an initial state is formalized by a canonical trace defined as follows.   
Definition 4.2.5  (Canonical Trace) We say that a trace is canonical if  
                                                 
2 We use ut.r to refer to the element r of the u-snapshot ut.   24
·  ST(0) = set of r-snapshots of the form (r, µ, µ, µ, µ,  disabled, Æ, Æ) for all roles r in the 
system, i.e., all r-snapshots are initialized to (r, µ, µ, µ, µ, disabled, Æ, Æ), and 
·  CT(0) = Æ, i.e., CT is initially empty.  
The  above  trace  definitions  enforce  the  intended  semantics  of  events.  The  set 
Nonblocked(EV(t)) contains the maximal priority events that actually happen.  We note that 
the constraints determine a unique state. We can see that the status information contained in ST(t) 
concerning the active state of roles depends on the valid activation constraints in CT(t). Given the 
previous state, event set and the valid activation constraint set, the following proposition holds. 
Proposition 4.2.1 For all event sequences EV, the initial status S0, and an initial set of valid 
activation constraints C0, there exists a unique trace (EV, ST,CT) with ST(0)=S0 and CT(0)=C0.
We use algorithm ComputeST shown in Figure 6 to update the status information based on the 
caused  events  that  are  nonblocked.  It  works  as  follows.  All  events  in  Nonblocked(EV(t)) 
happen  at  time  t.  The  status  information  ST(t)  contains  effect  of  the  events  in 
Nonblocked(EV(t)) on ST(t-1). First, all de-assignment events are handled. De-assigning of 
users  and  permissions  simply  involves  removing  associated  u-snapshots,  and  specified 
permissions associated with an r-snapshot.   
In Step 3, the disabling of a role is handled. First, the status is changed to disabled and. If a 
per--role constraint of form (C) is present, the values for dra, nra , drm and nrm are adjusted. dra= ¥ 
indicates that in the next role enabling there is possibly no total activation constraint. Next, using 
the FOR loop, all active user sessions corresponding to the disabled role are removed from the r-
snapshot. For constraints of forms (D, C) and (I, P, C), we do not need to make any update, as we 
simply use value 0 of a constraint variable as implying that the associated constraint cannot be 
satisfied anymore. In Step 4, per-role constraints of type (I, P, C) or (D, C) that are present in 
CT(t-1) but not in CT(t) are considered. These are constraints that just became inactive. The 
corresponding constraint variables are reset to ¥.    25
 
Figure 6. Algorithm computeST 
Algorithm ComputeST 
Input  : t, EV, ST, CT; 
Output  : ST(t); 
/ * Initially ST(0) = (r, µ, µ, µ, µ, disabled, Æ, Æ). For each pair (r, u) we use the associated snapshots rt = (r, dra, nra, drm,
nrm,status, Pr, Ur) ,  and ut = (u, r, dua, nua, dm, nm, Su, Du), where ut Î Ur. */ 
Let   C1 = Dactive, [Ddefault], activeR_total r;   C2 = Duactive, u, activeUR_total r;     
  C3 = Dmax, activeR_max r;      C4 = Dumax, u, activeUR_max r; 
   C5 = Nactive, [Ndefault], activeR_n r;    C6 = Nuactive, u, activeUR_n r;     
  C7 = Nmax, [Ndefault], activeR_total r;   C8 = Numax, u, activeUR_con r; 
STEP 1: FOR each (de-assign r to u) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO 
    Ur = Ur - {ut}; 
STEP 2: FOR each (de-assign p to r) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO 
    Pr = Pr - {p}; 
STEP 3: FOR each (disable r) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO   
    rt.status = disabled;  
    IF ((C1)Î CT (t)) THEN  dra = ¥;    IF ((C3)Î CT (t)) THEN  drm = ¥;  
    IF ((C5)Î CT (t)) THEN  nra = ¥;    IF ((C7)Î CT (t)) THEN  nrm = ¥;  
    FOR each ut Î Ur DO 
      Set (Su, Du) to (Æ,Æ); 
      IF (C2 Î CT (t) OR C1Î CT (t)) THEN dua = ¥;  IF (C4 Î CT (t) OR C3Î CT (t)) THEN dm = ¥; 
      IF (C6 Î CT (t) OR C5Î CT (t)) THEN nua = ¥;  IF (C8 Î CT (t) OR C7Î CT (t)) THEN nm = ¥; 
STEP 4 FOR each ((X, C) Î CT (t-1) and (X, C) Ï CT (t)) where X Î {(I, P), D} and C is a per-role activation constraint DO 
    IF C  = C1 THEN dra = ¥;      IF C  = C3 THEN drm = ¥;      
    IF C  = C5 THEN nra = ¥;      IF C  = C7 THEN nrm = ¥;     
STEP 5: FOR each (enable r) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO 
    rt.status = enabled; 
    IF ([(I, P)|D], C1) Î CT (t)) THEN dra = min(Dactive, dra);   IF ([(I, P)|D], C3) Î CT (t)) THEN drm = min(Dmax, drm);  
    IF ([(I, P)|D], C5) Î CT (t)) THEN nra = min(Nactive, nra);   IF ([(I, P)|D], C7) Î CT (t)) THEN nrm = min(Nmax, nrm); 
STEP 6: FOR each (assign p to r ) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO 
    Pr = Pr È{p}; 
STEP 7: FOR each (assign r to u ) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO 
    Ur = Ur È{(u, ¥, ¥, ¥, ¥, Æ,Æ)}; 
STEP 8: FOR each (s:deactivate r for u) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO 
    remove(s, Su, Du); 
STEP 9: FOR each  (s:activate r for u) Î Nonblocked(EV(t)) DO (assume rt for r and ut for u in rt) 
    rt.nra = rt.nra - 1;  ut.nua = ut.nua –1;  
    IF (([(I, P)|D], C2) Î CT (t)) THEN dua = Duactive; 
    ELSEIF (([(I, P)|D], C1) Î CT (t)) THEN dua = Ddefault;  
    IF (([(I, P)|D], C4) Î CT (t)) THEN dm = Dumax; 
    ELSEIF (([(I, P)|D], C3) Î CT (t)) THEN dm = Ddefault; 
    IF ([(I, P)|D], C6) Î CT (t) THEN nua = Nuactive; 
    ELSEIF ([(I, P)|D], C5) Î CT (t) THEN nua = Ndefault;  
    IF ([(I, P)|D], C8) Î CT (t)) THEN nm = Ndefault;          
    ELSEIF ([(I, P)|D], C5) Î CT (t) THEN nm = Ndefault;       
    d = min(dua, dm); 
    add(s, d, Su, Du); 
STEP 10: FOR each r-snapshot DO 
    IF status = enabled    
    THEN decrement (durations(r));  dra = dra - |sessions(r)|; 
    ELSE   
      dra = dra –1;      // for (I, D, C) and (D, C) constraints 
      FOR each user assigned to r DO 
        dua = dua –1;    // for (I, D, C) and (D, C) constraints 
 
We define the following supporting functions for use in the algorithm.  
 
remove(s, S, D), where, s is a session id,  S = {s1, s2, ... , sk} and D = {d1, d2, ... , dk} is a procedure that computes (S, D) such 
that S = S – {s} and D = D – {d}, where d corresponds to s. 
add(s, d, S, D), where, s is a session id, d is the duration of activation related to s, S = {s1, s2, ... , sk} and D = {d1, d2, ... , dk}; 
after processing, we get S = S È {s} and D = D È {d}. 
decrement(D), where D = {d1, d2, ... , dk} is a set of integers; after processing  we get  D = {d1-1, d2-1, ... , dk-1 }. 
sessions (r) returns a set of sessions {s1, s2, ... , sk }in which role r is currently activated. We can see that    
durations(r) returns a set of active durations {d1, d2, ... , dk}that corresponds to the sessions in sessions(r). 
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In Step 5, all events that enable roles are considered. The constraints corresponding to the enabled 
roles are checked and the constraint variables are set. We note that if the constraint variables are 
equal to ¥, then the values are set according to the current constraint, otherwise it indicated that 
there is either (I, P, C) or (D, C) constraint governing the variables and the constraint variables 
are still not equal to 0. So, each activation should not last more than the total remaining activation 
duration of the role. Hence the minimum of the remaining role duration and the duration specified 
by the currently active constraint is taken. 
Step 6 just adds the permissions assigned to roles at time t. Step 7 adds a new user who is 
assigned to a role. Note that the variables are initialized to ¥ and the constraint variables for a 
user are set when actual activation takes place. In Step 8, deactivation of a role by a user is 
handled by simply removing all the active sessions from the associated u-snapshot. Note that Step 
8 does not necessarily delete a user session, as the same session may exist in other r-snapshot. In 
Step 9, activation of a role by a particular user is handled. First, the cardinality variables per-role 
and per-user-role are decremented to indicate the remaining number of activations allowed after 
this  activation  request  has  been  granted.  Next,  users’  constraint  variables  are  initialized  and 
session information is entered in to session list. In step 10, each user’s remaining active duration 
is  decremented.  The  total  role  duration  is  also  adjusted  accordingly.  For  the  roles  that  are 
disabled, the duration constraint variables (for both roles and users assigned to them) are simply 
decremented. This takes care of any activation constraint that is valid at the time the associated 
role is disabled. 
We are left to specify which events must be in EV, given a TCAB T and a request stream RQ. 
Intuitively, each event should be caused by some element of T or RQ. When a trigger causes a 
prioritized event, the event expressions in the body of the trigger must not be blocked. These are 
formalized by the next definition, which captures the events that are caused at each time instant. 
An  event  can  be  caused  by  scheduled  periodic  events,  triggers  and  by  the  enforcement  of 
activation constraints. 
Definition 4.2.6 (Caused Events) The set of caused prioritized events at time t (w.r.t. a given 
trace, a given TCAB T and request stream RQ), is the least set Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) 
computed by Algorithm ComputeCausedSet reported in Figure 7.   
Algorithm  ComputCausedSet  shown  in  Figure  7  works  as  follows.  In  step  1,  all  events 
scheduled via a periodic event are added into set Caused(T, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ). In step 2, all   27
run-time events, but for the user-activation requests, are handled. The activation requests are 
handled  later  because  before  granting  such  a  request  one  must  ensure  that  all  activation 
constraints are enforced including the ones that become active at time t. In step 3, all events 
scheduled  by  a  trigger  are  caused  provided  the  status  conditions  are  satisfied  and  all  event 
expressions Eis are caused at time (t-¨t). The status information includes the role and assignment 
as well as the activation status information. Role status can be determined by checking status of 
the corresponding r-snapshot. Assignment status can be determined by checking Pr and Ur of the 
associated r-snapshot. A status expression Ci holds if it is true – for example if Ci is ‘r active for 
u’ then it is true if rt is the r-snapshot corresponding to role r and there is a u-snapshot ut Î rt.Ur 
such that u = ut.u and |ut.Su|>0. To check if status (assigned r to u) holds we check if there 
exists a u-snapshot in rt.Ur such that the u-snapshot is associated with user u. To determine if 
status (assigned p to r) holds we check if p is in rt.Pr. In step 4, duration constraints of form c 
= (I, P, C) are handled. If t is in Sol(I,P) then c is valid. Additionally if there is a trigger or a run-
time request for and event E for which C specifies the duration restriction, then based on the 
remaining duration, E is caused. Step 5 handles the duration constraint of form c = (D, C); here, c 
itself must have been enabled by a trigger or a run-time event. 
In step 6, the deactivation events that are caused because of activation constraints and/or the 
presence of a role-disabling or deassignment event are handled. In 6a (6b), we check to see if 
event “disable r”   (“de-assignU r to u”) is already in the caused set. If it is, then it causes 
deactivate events for all active sessions of r (activations of r by u)  Note that if the disabling 
event is to happen (it should not be blocked) then the corresponding deactivations must also 
happen, which involves removing all active sessions associated with the role. In 6c, we check to 
see if users meet restrictions on active durations. The sessions of users who have used all the 
allowed active durations need to be deactivated – hence, the deactivation events are caused by the 
expiry of the duration limits. In 6d, we check to see if all currently active sessions can be retained 
till the next time instant based on the remaining total active duration of the role. If not, then some 
selection criteria is used to select sessions that are to be removed by causing deactivation events 
– such a selection may be based on priorities on user role assignment or on elapsed durations. 
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Algorithm  ComputeCausedSet 
 
Input  : t, EV, ST, CT, T and RQ ;  
Output  : Caused (t, EV, ST,CT, T, RQ) 
  /* We will use CausedSet(t) = Caused (t, EV, ST,CT, T, RQ) ;*/ 
  CausedSet(t) = = Æ; 
  // Handle periodic events // 
Step 1.   FOR each  (I, P, pr:E) Î T DO 
    IF tÎ Sol(I, P) THEN CausedSet(t) = CausedSet(t) È {pr:E}; 
  // Handle run-time non-activation request //  
Step 2.   FOR each (pr:E after 
￿ t) Î RQ(t-
￿ t) DO  
    IF E ¹ s: activate r for u and  0 £ 
￿ t £ t THEN CausedSet(t) = CausedSet(t) È {pr:E}; 
  // Handle triggers // 
Step 3.  FOR each trigger [E1 ,…, En , C1 ,…, Ck ®  p:E after 
￿ t ]  Î T DO 
  IF  ((0£
￿ t £ t) &  (" Ci ,  (1 £ i £ k)  Ci holds at time (t - 
￿ t)) & ("Ei (1 £ i £ n), pr:Ei Î Nonblocked(EV(t - 
￿ t))))  
  THEN CausedSet (t) = CausedSet (t) È {pr: Ei}; 
  // Handle valid Duration constraints with (I, P)// 
Step 4.  FOR each  c = (I, P, Dx, pr:E) Î T where x Î {U, R, P} and t Î Sol(I, P) DO 
    IF  ($ t1 such that   
      (t1 Î Sol(I, P) &  0 £ 
￿ t = (t- t1) £ Dx &   
       ($ [B ® pr:E after 
￿ t] Î T OR pr:EÎRQ(t- t1), by which pr:E Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t - t1)))))  
    THEN CausedSet (t) = CausedSet (t) È {pr: E}; 
 
  // Handle valid Duration constraints with D // 
Step 5.  FOR each c = (D, Dx, pr:E) Î T where x Î {U, R, P} DO 
    IF  $ t1, t2 such that   
      (t1 £ t2 & 0 £ 
￿ t1 = (t- t1) £ D & 0 £ 
￿ t2 = (t- t2) £ Dx &   
       ($ [B ® pr:enable c after 
￿ t1] Î T  OR pr:enable c ÎRQ(t- t1)  
        because of which enable c Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t- t1))) & 
       ($ [B ® pr:E after 
￿ t2] Î T OR pr:EÎRQ(t- t2), by which pr:E Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t – t2))) 
    THEN CausedSet (t) = CausedSet (t) È {pr: E}; 
Step 6.  FOR each r-snapshot rt associated with role r DO 
    // Handle the effect of disable r – deactivates all active instances of r // 
  6a.  IF ( (disable r) Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t)) & rt.status = enabled, where rt is r’s r-snapshot) ) THEN 
    FOR each si Î ut.Su  such that utÎ rt.Ur DO 
      CausedSet (t) = CausedSet(t) È {si: de-activate r for ut.u}; 
    // Handle the effect of the de-assignment events // 
  6b.  IF ( ( (de-assign r to u) Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t)) & (assigned r to u) ) THEN 
    FOR each si Î ut.Su such that (utÎ rt.Ur & ut. u = u) DO 
      CausedSet (t) = CausedSet(t) È {si: de-activate r for .u};   
    // Remove sessions that expire // 
  6c.   FOR each ut = rt.Ur., such that $ s ,d  (s Î ut.Su, and  d Î ut.Du and d = 0) DO 
       CausedSet (t) = CausedSet (t) È {si: de-activate r for ut.u);   
    // Cardinality control // 
  6d.  IF ( ((disable r) Ï Nonblocked(CausedSet(t))& (rt.status = enabled)) OR   
          ((enable r) Î Nonblocked(CausedSet (t)) ))  THEN 
      DA = |{e| e is of type (s: de-activate r for u’) and e Î Nonblocked(CausedSet (t))}|; 
    x = dra - | sessions(r) - DA|; 
    IF  x < 0 THEN 
      Select a set Ud = {up1, .. , up|x| }using some predefined selection criteria 
      For all ui Î Ud do CausedSet (t) =CausedSet(t) È {si: de-activate r for ui); 
Step 7    // Handle user’s activation requests // 
    i = 1;        
    FOR each (s: activate r for u after 
￿ t) Î RQ(t-
￿ t) such that 
￿ t £ t DO 
      IF (( ((disable r) Ï Nonblocked(CausedSet(t))& rt.status  = enabled) OR 
              ((enable r) Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t)) ) & (assigned r to u) )  
      THEN 
        Let the associated rt Î ST(t-1) be (r, dra, nra, status, Pr, Ur); 
        DA=|{e| e is of type (s: de-activate r for u’) & e Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t))}|; 
        IF ((dra - i - | sessions(r)- DA| > 0) & (nra - i > 0) & (dua -  |Su| - 1 > 0) & (|Su| < nm) THEN 
          CausedSet (t)=CausedSet (t) È {si: activate r for ui); 
          i = i  + 1; 
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In step 7, a run-time activation request is accepted as a caused event if the request for activation 
can be granted. This is possible if the role is enabled and the activation of the event does not 
violate any  activation  constraints. The conditions  ensure that  (a)  the  role  is enabled,  (b)  the 
acceptance of the i
th activation request will not violate the constraint in the current as well as next 
time instant. For example if dra - i - |sessions (r) + DA|  = 0, it means that when dra is updated in 
the next time instant the total activation time allowed for the role will be used up exactly; in that 
case only i requests can be granted, rest of the activation events are not caused. 
Now we are ready to define the system behavior induced by specific TCABs and request streams. 
Intuitively, we require each EV (t) to contain all and only those events that have a specific cause. 
Definition 4.2.7 (Execution Model) A trace (EV, ST, CT) is an execution model of a TCAB T and 
a request stream RQ, if for all t ³ 0, 
EV (t) = Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) .   
Unfortunately,  some  specifications  may  yield  no  execution  model,  whereas  some  ambiguous 
specifications may admit two or more such models. However, there are many interesting cases in 
which the specifications yield exactly one model, for all possible run-time requests. There are 
simple syntactic conditions that prevent any pathological interplay between conflicting events. 
Such syntactic conditions - called safeness - will be introduced in the next section. Before we 
introduce the notion of safety, we establish the correctness of the two algorithms discussed above 
with the following theorems. 
For all practical purposes we can assume that the number of users, roles and sessions allowed are 
finite.  Let  nR  =  |Roles|  be  the  number  of  roles,  nP  =  |Permissions|  be  the  number  of 
permissions, nU = |Users| be the number of users and nSm = |Sessions|m be the maximum 
number of sessions allowed in the system. 
Theorem 4.1 (Correctness and Complexity of ComputeCausedSet): Given EV(t), CT(t), 
ST(t-1), a TCAB T with a finite number of constraints, and RQ(t) with a finite number of run-time 
requests, the following holds true for Algorithm ComputeCausedSet: 
1.  it outputs Caused(t, EV, ST,CT, T, RQ) which contains an event E  iff at least one of the 
following holds true: 
a.  E is caused by a periodicity constraint,  
b.  E is caused by a run-time request,   30
c.  E is caused by a trigger, 
d.  E is caused by a duration constraint,  
e.  E is a deactivation event that is caused by disabling of a role, de-assignment of a role 
to a user or an active constraint, or 
f.  E is an activation event that is not blocked and can be allowed by valid activation 
constraints at time t. 
2.  it terminates, and has complexity O(nT + nRQ + nR( nSm + nU)), where nT is the number of 
constraint in T at time t, nRQ is the number of run-time requests considered at time t.    
Theorem 4.2 (Correctness and complexity of ComputeST): Given EV(t), CT(t), ST(t-1) and 
TCAB T, the following holds true for algorithm ComputeST: 
1.  it  produces  ST(t)  such  that  the  updated  status  of  r-snapshots    and  u-snapshots  in  ST(t) 
satisfies all the constraints in T and the valid activation constraints in CT for interval (t, t+1). 
2.  it terminates, and has complexity O(nR (nU + nP+ nSm)).  
For practical purposes, we can expect nRQ to be smaller compared to other factors contributing to 
the complexity. Provided that there is at least one constraint for each role enabling/disabling and 
user-role or role-permission assignment, we can see that the worst case for the number of use-role 
and role-permission assignments is O(nR . nU + nR . nP)). Similarly, the worst-case scenario for the 
number of activation constraints can be expressed as O(nR + nR .nU), considering all the possible 
per-role and per-user-role constraints. Thus considering that nRQ and number of triggers in nT are 
small compared to the other factors, the complexity expression O(nT + nRQ + nR . nSm + nR . nU) of 
algorithm ComputeCausedSet has three major complexity factors, viz, nR . nU (i.e., all roles 
assigned to all users), nR . nP (i.e., all permissions assigned to all the roles) and nR . nSm. (i.e. all 
the roles are activated in all user sessions). However, this worst-case scenario is also present in 
any RBAC systems. Generally, in practice, we expect that users will not activate many sessions. 
Similarly, in practice, not all roles are assigned to every user, and not all permissions are assigned 
to every role. While handling of triggers in Step 3 may be costly if there is a huge set of triggers, 
we expect it to be a small set in practice. 
The worst case for nRQ can be given as O(nR . (nU + nP + nSm)) considering that all user-role, and 
role-permission  assignments  and  activation  requests  are  in  RQ(t).  However,  this  does  not 
introduce any new complexity factor we have not considered above.    31
We also see that the complexity of ComputeST also has the same three key complexity factors 
and hence discussions above also apply here. 
The algorithm computeCT shown in Figure 8 is used to compute the active constraints after the 
caused event set has been computed by algorithm ComputeCausedSet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Safe TCABs 
Next, we introduce a syntactic condition that can be verified in polynomial time and guarantees 
that a given TCAB has one and exactly one execution model.  The notion of dependency graph is 
essential for this purpose. 
Definition 4.3.1 (Labeled Dependency Graph) [5]: Each TCAB T is associated with a (directed) 
labeled dependency graph DGR = áN, Eñ where: 
·  N (set of nodes) coincides with the set of all prioritized event expressions pr:E that occur 
in the head of the trigger [B®pr:E]Î T; 
·  E (the set of edges) consists of the following triples
3, for all triggers [B ® pr:E] Î T, for 
all events E’ in the body B, and for all nodes q:E’ Î N  
-  áq:E’, +, pr:Eñ  
-  ár:Conf(E’), - , pr:Eñ, for all [r:Conf(E’)] Î N such that q   r.    
Definition 4.3.2 (Safeness): A TCAB T is safe if its dependency graph DGR contains no cycles in 
which some edge is labeled ‘-’. 
It can be shown using the results from [5] that if a TCAB T is safe, then the system' s behavior is 
unambiguously determined by T, RQ and the initial status of the roles and assignments. 
                                                 
3 Each triple (N1, l, N2) represents an edge from node N1 to N2, labeled by l. 
Figure 8. Algorithm computeCT 
Algorithm computeCT 
Input: Caused set, CT(t-1) 
Output CT(t) 
CT(t) = CT(t-1); 
For each (enable c) Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t)) 
  CT(t) = CT(t) È {c}; // Note that c = (C) or (D, C) 
For each (disable c) Î Nonblocked(CausedSet(t)) 
  CT(t) = CT(t) – {c}; // Note that c = (C) or (D, C) 
For each c = (C) Î T do 
  CT(t) = CT(t) È {c}; 
For each  (I, P, C) Î T do 
  If tÎ Sol(I, P) then   CT(t) = CT(t) È {c};   32
We note that safeness is a sufficient condition for good system behavior. Further, it is difficult to 
find necessary conditions and even if they are found, they offer little practical help, because such 
syntactic properties (such as graph-based ones) fail to recognize that ill-formed portions of the 
program may be harmless because they can never be activated [5]. Checking model existence and 
model uniqueness are, in general, NP-hard problems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm SafetyCheck illustrated in Figure 8 is used for the safeness verification of a TCAB. 
The first part of the algorithm builds the dependency graph associated with T, and the second part 
checks for cycles with a negative edge. The correctness of the algorithm can be simply proved 
from the results reported in [5]. We note the following with respect to the labeled dependency 
graph: 
·  Dependency graph construction takes polynomial time. Such complexity can be reduced to 
O(|T|.|N|)  by  representing  the  graph  as  an    ordered  vector,  which  can  be  sorted  in  time 
O(|N|.log|N|). 
·  The strongly connected components of the graph can be determined in O(|N| + |E|) time (cf. 
[7]). As the total number of edges is bounded by |E|, the second phase of the algorithm has 
cost O(|N| + |E|). 
·  As each node must occur in some trigger’s head, |N| = |T| and |E| is in O(|T|
2).  
Figure 9: Algorithm for safeness verification 
Algorithm SafetyCheck 
Input: : a TCAB  T 
Output: true if T is safe, false otherwise 
begin 
/* construction of the dependency graph */  
N := 0;  E:= 0;  
for all [B ® pr:E] Î T  do 
if (E = s:activate r for u) then return false; 
N := N È{pr:E};  
for all [B ® pr:E] Î T  do 
for all E’ Î B such that $q; q:E’ Î N do 
E:= E È {áq:E’, +, pr:Eiñ }; 
for all r:conf(E’) Î N such that q   r do 
  E:= E È{ár:conf(E’), - , pr:Eiñ} 
/* cycle generation and checking */  
SCC := strongly connected components of áN, Eñ  
for all áN’, E’ñ Î SCC do 
     for all áX, l, Yñ Î E’ do 
    if l = ‘-‘ then return false; 
return true 
end 
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From this, we see that the algorithm’s complexity is in O(|T|
2). We note that the number of 
iterations of the innermost loop of the graph construction phase is bounded by a constant (i.e., 
|Prios|) for a fixed set of priorities. Hence, for a given set of priorities, the cost of the safeness 
verification check drops down to O(|T|. log|T|). 
Further  improvements  to  the  costs  of  safeness  verification  can  be  achieved  by  adopting 
incremental  graph  construction  methods,  and  by  caching  the  set  of  strongly  connected 
components [6]. Insertion or update of a trigger simply involves insertion/deletion of only a few 
edges, and the consideration of only the old strongly connected components containing the events 
in the new/updated trigger if no new nodes are created.  
5 Implementation Architecture 
In  this  section,  we  present  implementation  architecture  of  a  system  supporting  the  proposed 
GTRBAC  model.  The  architecture  extends  the  one  proposed  in  [5]  by  including  required 
functionalities to handle the new temporal constraints. 
A critical design issue is to determine at each time the set of roles that a user can activate and/or 
the  duration  for  which  the  user  can  activate,  according  to  various  constraints  and  triggers 
contained in the TCAB, and the run-time requests issued till that point.  
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A request by a user to activate a role is granted if the user is assigned to the role at that particular 
time, and there are no activation constraints enabled at that time, preventing the activation of the 
role by the user. User-role and role-permission assignments, role enabling, constraint enabling as 
well as the activations/deactivations of roles by users can be either immediately executed, or 
deferred by a fixed time interval. Moreover, priorities are associated with each event, and such 
priorities  must  be  considered  when  dealing  with  conflicting  actions.  Figure  10  shows  the 
architecture of the system we have developed for supporting GTRBAC constraint on top of a 
commercial DBMS. The figure shows data structures as rectangles and functional components as 
ovals.  Arrows  represent  interactions  among  the  various  entities.  Various  components  are 
described in the following section. 
5.1 Data structures  
Information  on  role  activations  and  deactivations,  periodic  events  and  run-time  requests  are 
maintained in the database tables. More precisely, the data maintained by the system are: 
1.  Role_Activation_Base:  This  is  a  set  of  tables  that  actually  implements  the  r-snapshot 
representation  of  each  role  in  the  system.  The  tables  contain  information  about  valid 
assignments, currently active user-role sessions and their corresponding durations as well as 
various constraint parameters related to activation constraints. A sample set of tables for RAB 
is shown in Figure 11.  
As shown in Table 1 of Figure 11, the values of the constraint parameters change as different 
per-role  constraints  become  active.  Similarly  Table  2  shows  user-role  assignments.  The 
parameters  refer  to  the  per-user-role  constraints.  Table  3  lists  the  current  sessions  and 
corresponding duration for each activation of a role and Table 4 shows the valid permission 
assignments. In Figure 10, role information base (RIB), users information base (UIB) and 
permission information base (PIB) indicate static reservoir of roles, users and permissions 
along with supporting description. Although they are not strictly needed, such a separation 
from  RAB  can  be  advantageous  particularly  because  all  tables  in  RAB  are  essentially 
dynamic and are affected by constraints and triggers in TCAB, and run-time requests.   35
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2.  Deferred_Actions_Base: This is a set of tables that store actions that need to be executed after 
a certain amount (or a period) of time. For each action, the time instant (or the periodic set of 
instants) at which it has to be executed is recorded along with the priority of the action. To 
efficiently store different kinds of event actions, more than one table may be desirable. Figure 
12 shows a sample set of DAB tables. The main table is essentially the master list of all 
actions with the temporal constraint information. The detailed action information is stored in 
different tables according to the type of action. For example, Action Type = at1 represents 
the enabling and disabling of roles and the table corresponding to this store information about 
the role, action to perform (enabling or disabling) and the priority associated with the action. 
In  Figure 12, the table that corresponds to Action Type = at2 is for both user-role assignment 
and  role  activation  by  users  (they  can  be  separate  if  necessary).  We  also  note  that  an 
activate request can only come from a run-time user request and hence the associated 
time of the request is stored in the master list (for example the last entry t). The remaining 
two tables are associated with the role-permission assignment and constraint enabling. If a 
deferred action is caused by a trigger, the time of firing of the trigger is stored in the master 
list. We also note that a duration constraint c of type (D, C) can be enabled only by a run-time 
request or a trigger. Hence, whenever such a constraint is enabled, it can be stored in the 
corresponding DAB table along with the time at which such a run-time request is made or a 
trigger fired. 
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3.  Valid_Constraint: It is a table that stores valid constraint at a particular time. A constraint can 
be valid based on the periodic expression that specifies the intervals in which it is valid or 
when it is enabled through a run-time request or a trigger.  
4.  Actions: It is a table that records all the actions to be potentially executed and corresponds to 
the Caused defined earlier. Such actions can be caused by a trigger, a run-time request, or a 
periodic/duration event. Note that all events caused at a particular time need be non-blocked. 
This table is necessary in cases where conflicting events are caused. In such a scenario, some 
of the events are invalidated. 
5.  Events. This is a global event base, which records all the events of the system. 
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5.2 Functional modules  
The system consists of seven main modules (Figure 10), namely the Safeness Checker, Trigger 
Compiler,  the  Periodic  Event  Handler,  the  Duration/activation  Event  Handler,  the  Run-time 
Request Handler, the Deferred Action Handler, and the Action Handler. Next, we describe each 
of the modules. 
Safeness checker: Whenever a trigger is inserted or modified, the Safeness Checker is activated. It 
determines whether such an operation can be allowed. In case the operation makes the TCAB 
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unsafe then the operation is rejected by the system. An incremental version of the algorithm in 
Figure 9 that does not rebuild the dependency graph whenever such a trigger is added can be 
used. If the insertion/modification of a trigger does not make the TCAB unsafe, the Safeness 
Checker passes the inserted trigger to the Trigger Compiler. Deletion of a trigger does not make 
the TCAB unsafe and hence requires no safeness checks. 
Trigger Compiler: Trigger Compiler is used to translate the inserted trigger into an equivalent 
underlying database trigger attached to table Events. The translation depends on the number and 
types of expressions appearing in the trigger body and on the type of action that the firing of the 
trigger  causes.  If  the  action  caused  by  the  trigger  has  to  be  immediately  executed,  the 
corresponding database trigger inserts the action into table Actions, along with its action priority. 
However, if the action has to be deferred, the firing of the corresponding database trigger will 
cause  the  insertion  of  the  action  into  Deferred_Actions_Base  along  with  its  priority  and  the 
information about the time instant at which the action has to be executed. Note that trigger can 
enable some constraints. Such enabled constraints are inserted into the Valid_Constraints table. 
The  Trigger  compiler  is  an  extended  version  of  the  Trigger  Compiler  described  in  [5].  The 
extension  is  aimed  at  incorporating  all  types  of  events  possible  in  GTRBAC.  For  detailed 
description of trigger generation for the GTRBAC in Oracle Object-database systems, we refer 
the readers to [5]. 
Periodic Event Handler: Whenever a periodic event is inserted into TCAB, the Periodic Event 
Handler inserts a corresponding entry into Deferred_Actions_Base. The entry contains the action 
requested by the periodic event, its priority, and the associated periodic constraint. Note that some 
duration  constraints  have  periodic  expressions that  determine  when  the  constraints  are  valid. 
Corresponding entries for these are also inserted into the Deferred_Actions_Base. A deletion is 
handled simply by removing the corresponding entry from the Deferred_Actions_Base. 
Duration/activation Event Handler: When a duration constraint for role enabling/assignment or 
an activation constraint is inserted, it is first processed by the Duration/activation Event Handler. 
If the constraint is of form (C), it means the constraint is immediately enabled (not restricted by 
(I,P) or (D)) and hence it is put into Valid_Constraint. If the constraint is of the form (I, P, C), 
then it checks to see if it is enabled at that time. If it is then the constraint (C) is inserted into 
Valid_Constraints and (I, P, C) is inserted into Deferred_Action_Base, otherwise only (I, P, C) 
needs to be entered in Deferred_Action_Base.   38
Run-time Request Handler: Run-time requests are processed by the Run-time Request Handler. If 
the request needs to be immediately processed, i.e., if  ¨t = 0, it sends the action to the Action 
Handler, otherwise it puts an entry into the Deferred_Action_Base along with the time of request 
and its priority.  
Deferred Action Handler: Execution of the deferred periodic actions that the firing of a trigger, 
the  issuing  of  a  run-time  request,  or  a  periodic/duration  event  can  cause,  is  handled  by  the 
Deferred  Action  Handler.  It  essentially  monitors  the    Deferred_Action_Base  to  execute  the 
actions it contains at appropriate times. Such a module can be implemented as a daemon that 
maintains a list of instants at which it has to wake up. With regards to the periodic actions, the 
Deferred Action Handler maintains the first instants at which the action has to be executed and 
the time period between any two consecutive executions of the action. Whenever a new entry is 
inserted into Deferred_Action_Base these time instants are updated. When the daemon wakes up, 
the actions that have to be carried out at that time instant are selected. It selects the action with the 
highest  priority  if  If  there  are  conflicting  actions  (in  case  of  equal  priority  negatives-take 
precedence rule is used). Then, it returns the action along with its priority to the Action Handler. 
Action Handler: The Action Handler is the core of the system, as it is in charge of updating 
Role_Acivation_Base according to the actions requested by the other modules or caused by the 
firing of the triggers associated with the Events table. As conflicts may arise among actions, the 
Action Handler collects all the required actions into table Actions. It resolves any conflicts before 
updating the Role_Acivation_Base. Note that the Action handler essentially extracts the non-
blocked events caused at the particular time and implements algorithm computeST to update 
the Role_Acivation_Base. The remaining functional modules each implements a part of the 
algorithm comaputeCausedSet. However, each is augmented with functionalities to 
determine the deferred events and inserting it into the Deferred_Action_Base tables. 
6 Related Work 
Need for supporting constraints in an RBAC model has been addressed by many researchers. In 
particular, the attention has been in supporting separation of duties (SoD) constraints [1, 4, 9, 10, 
12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21]. SoD constraints are mainly aimed at reducing the risk of a fraud by not 
allowing any individual to have sufficient rights to perpetrate such frauds. Ferrariolo et. al. [8] 
propose an RBAC model that supports the cardinality constraints. In [1], Ahn et. al. propose 
RCL2000 – a role based constraint specification language. Bertino et. al. have proposed a logic   39
based constraint specification language that can be used to specify constraint on roles and users 
and their assignments to workflow tasks [4]. In [9], the workflow model of [4] has been extended. 
However, none of these include temporal constraints in their specification models. 
The TRBAC model proposed by Bertino et. al. [5], is the first known model that addresses the 
temporal  constraints.  It,  however,  provides  constraints  only  on  role  enabling  and  triggers, 
considerably  limiting  its  use  in  many  diverse  real world application requirements.  The  work 
presented here is a generalization of the TRBAC model and constitutes a substantial enhancement 
over it. Another related work is the access control model presented by Bertino et. al. in [3] that 
supports temporal authorization and derivation rules. Formalism for periodic time used in this 
paper has been borrowed from [3, 11]. 
7 Conclusions and future work 
We have proposed a generalized temporal role based access control model that can handle a 
comprehensive  set  of  temporal  constraints.  The  model  allows  temporal  constraints  on  role 
enablings and role activations. Various temporal restrictions can be specified on user-role and 
role-permission assignments. We have also illustrated through examples the applicability of the 
GTRBAC temporal constraints.  
We plan to extend the present work in various directions. The first direction is an extensive 
investigation on how various temporal constraints on roles affect the inheritance semantics of a 
role hierarchy. Role hierarchy is a highly beneficial feature of an RBAC model and hence it is 
very essential to have a proper notion of temporal hierarchy in a GTRBAC framework.  
Another key issue that needs to be extensively investigated is the issue of whether such a huge set 
of temporal constraint is beneficial from a practical as well as theoretical perspective. We plan to 
establish through theoretical analysis that having the current set of constraints is beneficial from 
the perspective of user-convenience and better constraint representation, even though we believe 
that the model may not be minimal. We plan to investigate and identify such a minimal model 
that has the least set of temporal constraint with the same expressive power as that of the current 
set of GTRBAC constraints. We believe that the current set of GTRBAC constraints provide a 
flexible,  more  intuitive,  convenient  and  computationally  better  representation  of  temporal 
constraints than such a minimal model, which we believe exists. Finally, we also plan to develop 
an SQL-like language for specifying the GTRBAC temporal.   40
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 4.1 -  Proof of part (1) 
(Þ) Assume that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ). We have to show that E is caused by one 
of the constraints in (a)-(f).  We show this by cases. 
Case 1.  Let E = enable(disable) r    
First we note that event E can be added to Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) at five different places, 
the THEN parts of the statements in steps 1-5, through the execution of the statement  
Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ) = Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ) È{pr:E}.          (s1) 
First, assume that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) because of the execution of statement (s1) 
in  Step  1.  This  means  that  the  condition  specified  in  FOR  and  IF  parts  of  Step  1  are  true. 
However, the FOR and IF conditions imply that there is a periodicity constraint (I, P, pr:E) Î T 
for which t Î Sol(I,P) hold true. Hence, E is caused by a periodicity constraint. 
Assume that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) because of the execution of statement  (s1) in 
Step 2. This means that the conditions specified in FOR and IF parts of Step 2 are true. But these 
conditions imply that there is a runtime request (pr:E after ¨t ) made at time (t -¨t). Hence, E 
is caused by a runtime request. 
Suppose EÎ Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) because of the execution of statement  (s1) in Step 3. 
This means that the conditions specified in FOR and IF parts of Step 3 are true. This means there 
is a trigger [E1 ,…, En , C1 ,…, Ck ®  p:E after  ¨t ] in T at time (t -¨t). Furthermore, the 
conditions imply that each of the events Ei is non-blocked at time (t -¨t) and each of the status 
expressions Cis holds true at time (t -¨t). Hence, by the semantics of triggers, [E1 ,…, En , C1 ,…, 
Ck ®  p:E after ¨t ] is the cause for event E.. 
Similarly, assume that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) because of the execution of statement  
(s1) in Step 4. Then, as the conditions specified in FOR part of Step 4 must be true, it means that 
there is a duration constraint c = (I, P, DU, pr:E) in T valid at time t as indicated by the FOR 
condition. Similarly, the IF condition implies that, the event E is caused at time t1, which is a 
valid time instant of (I, P) (as indicated by the condition t1 Î Sol(I,P)). Since (t-t1) £ DU and the   43
event E is triggered or requested at run-time, it implies that event E can be allowed under this 
duration constraint. Hence, E is caused (or allowed) by the duration constraint c. 
Finally, assume that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) because of the execution of statement  
(s1) in Step 5. Then, the conditions specified in FOR part of Step 4 imply that there is a duration 
constraint c = (D, DR, pr:E) in T valid at time t. Furthermore, truth of the IF condition implies that 
constraint c has been enabled by a trigger or a run-time request at time t1 and as (t -t1) £ D, it 
means that the valid duration D of the constraint c hasn’t expired. The remaining part of the IF 
condition implies that E is triggered or requested at run-time at t2 and because (t –t2) £ DR and t1£ 
t2,  it  follows  that  c  allows  E  to  be  caused.  Hence,  E  is  caused  (or  allowed)  by  a  duration 
constraint. 
As the remaining steps do not put E = enable(disable) r into Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, 
RQ),  they  cannot  cause  E.  The  cases  for  E  =  “assignUR(deassignUR)  u  to  r”,  E  = 
“assignPR(deassignPR) p to r” are similar to the case for E = “enable(disable) r”. 
Hence, the proof for them is similar to that given above. The case for ‘enable(disable) c’ is 
the same as for enable(disable) r, except that it is not caused by a periodicity or duration 
constraint. Hence, for ‘enable(disable) c’, we need to focus only on steps 2 and 3, the 
arguments for which are, again, the same as that for ‘enable(disable) r’. 
Case 2: E = s:deactivate r for u 
In this case E can be in Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ) only through the execution of the following 
statement in steps 6(a) - 6(d): 
  Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ) = Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ) È{ s:deactivate r for u }  (s2) 
We note that steps 6(a), - 6(d) repeat for each role as indicated by the FOR loop at Step 6. Now, 
assume that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ), because of the execution of statement  (s2) in 
Step 6(a). This means the IF condition of Step 6(a) is true, which implies that ‘disable r’ is a 
non-blocked event at that time and user u has an active session of role r at t. Since ‘disable r’ 
is non-blocked, r will be disabled at t, and there cannot be any active user session for role r 
henceforth. Therefore, all currently active sessions need to be deactivated. This causes the event 
E  to  be  added  to  Caused(t,  EV,  ST,  T,  RQ).  Hence,  the  disabling  of  a role  causes  E. The 
argument is similar for 6(b), except that here the non-blocked de-assignment of a role to a user is 
considered and only the active sessions of the user are removed.   44
Next, assume that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) because of the execution of statement  (s2) 
in Step 6(c). This means the FOR condition of Step 6(Cc) must be true, which implies that the 
activation of role r by u cannot be allowed further, as the total active duration (because of an 
activation constraint) allowed for the user has expired (d = 0). Hence, E is caused by an active 
per-user-role constraint, i.e., by (e). 
Finally,  assume  that  E  Î  E  Î  Caused(t,  EV,  ST,  CT,  T,  RQ)  because  of  the  execution  of 
statement  (s2) in Step 6(d), so both the inner and the outer IF conditions are true. The outer IF 
condition ensures that role r will be non-blocked at time t. As the inner IF condition is also true, E 
is selected by the pre-defined selection criteria. The condition x < 0, indicates that the total role 
active duration allowed will be exceeded if the activation of role r by u is not cancelled by 
deactivating it. Thus, in this case, E is caused by the total role active duration.  
Case 3: E = s: activation r for u 
In this case E can be in E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) only through the execution of the 
following statement in Step 7: 
Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ)  = Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) È{ s:activate r for u } (s3) 
We note that Step 7 repeats for each role as indicated by the FOR loop at Step 6. Since E Î 
Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) can only be because of the execution of statement  (s3) in Step 7, 
it follows that all conditions in FOR and IF statements in Step 7 must be true. The FOR condition 
implies that there is a runtime request for activating role r for user u, as s: activate r for u 
after ¨t Î RQ(t-¨t). The outer IF condition ensures that the role r will be enabled at time t 
and there is a valid user-role assignment. Let E be the i
th activation event caused (or allowed). 
The condition (dra - i - | sessions(r)- DA| > 0) implies that by causing E, the system will not 
violate the total role active duration constraint. Similarly, since (nra - i > 0) is true it implies that 
the cardinality restriction for the role is not violated either. The condition dua -  |Su| - 1 > 0 is true 
implies that per-user-role constraint for total active duration is not violated by granting the user 
activation request. And lastly, (|Su| < nm) ensures that the cardinality restriction specified for the 
user u as to how many concurrent activations of role r s/he can have, is not violated. Thus, E is 
caused by the combination of a run-time request and the activation constraint, i.e., by (b) and (f). 
(Ü) Assume that one of (a)-(f) causes event E . We need to show that E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, 
CT, T, RQ).   45
Case 1. E is caused by (a), i.e. periodicity constraint. 
Since E is caused by a periodicity constraint, it means there is a constraint (I, P, pr:E) Î T such 
that t Î Sol(I, P). All such constraints are handled in Step 1, as FOR loop repeats for all such 
constraints. The IF condition is satisfied as t Î Sol(I, P) and therefore, the THEN part of the IF 
statement is executed adding event E into Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ). Thus, after the execution of 
the IF statement (Step 1), E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ). 
Case 2. E ¹ activate r for u, is caused by (b), i.e. by a run-time request other than the 
activation request: 
Since E is caused by a run-time request, the event E must be in RQ at the time when the request is 
made. The request made is in the form “pr:E after ¨t”.  Therefore a request “pr:E after ¨t” must 
be in RQ(t-¨t) for E to be caused at time t by it. This condition is precisely the one used in the 
FOR loop for picking up all such events that need to be caused at time t in Step 2. The IF 
condition further checks if the request was made at or before time t and is satisfied. Therefore, the 
THEN  part  of  the  statement  adds  the  event  E  in  Caused(t,  EV,  ST,  T,  RQ).  Hence,  E  Î 
Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) after Step 2. 
Case 3. E is caused by (c), i.e. by a trigger. 
Since E is caused by a trigger, a trigger of form “[B ® pr:E after ¨t]”  must be in RQ(t-¨t) for 
0£ ¨t  £ t. Furthermore, all the events in B must have been caused and non-blocked at time (t-¨t), 
and all the conditions in B must hold true at time (t-¨t). The conditions for the IF statement in 
Step 3 checks for these and hence are all satisfied. Therefore, the THEN part of the IF statement 
executes adding event E in Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ), i.e., E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, 
RQ) after Step 3. 
Case 4. E is caused by (d), i.e. by a duration constraint 
Since GTRBAC has two forms of duration constraint, we will take each one separately. First 
assume that E is caused by a duration constraint of the form c = (I, P, D, pr:E). This means t Î 
Sol(I, P), because the constraint c must be valid at time t, and (I, P) precisely defines those 
instants at which c is valid. Furthermore, for E to be caused by (or allowed under) constraint c, 
there must be a non-blocked event E, which is either triggered or present in RQ at time t or 
earlier, but at a time instant that is in Sol(I, P). The IF condition of Step 4 precisely checks for 
such a time instant t1; furthermore the duration should not be expired, i.e. t- t1 £ D. hence, the IF   46
condition is satisfied. It is possible that both the enabling of the constraint and the triggering or 
run-time request of the event E can also take place at time t. The algorithm will handle this 
correctly because Step 1 through Step 3 captures both these types of events. Thus, the THEN part 
of the statement in Step 4 will be executed adding the event E into Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) 
after esuring that t - t1 £ D, and hence, E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) after Step 4. 
Now assume that E is caused by (or allowed under) a duration constraint of form c = (D, Dx, 
pr:E). Since the constraint c itself is valid for only a particular duration D, there must be an event 
“enable c” that has been caused as the result of which c is valid at time t. A trigger or a run-
time request must have caused such an “enable c” event. Hence, one of the condition that 
checks for such event is satisfied in the IF statement of Step 5.  Furthermore, D and Dx, should 
not be expired implying that we must have (t- t1 £ D) and (t- t2 £ Dx), where t1 is the time at which 
c is enabled and t2 is the time at which E is caused. Furthermore, t1 £ t2 ensures that Dx is 
contained in D. This implies that the conditions in the IF statement are satisfied. Hence, the 
THEN part of the IF statement is executed, adding the event E in Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ). We 
note that if the event E is triggered at time t for the first time since c became active, then it is 
added in Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) two times, once in Step 2 or Step 3 and another in step 5; 
but  since  Caused(t,  EV,  ST,  CT,  T,  RQ)  is  a  set,  it  is  represented  only  once.  Hence,  E  Î 
Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) after step 5. 
Case 5. E is caused by (e), i.e. E is a deactivation event that is caused by disabling of a role or 
active constraints, 
First, we consider E caused by the disabling of a role. That is, E is an event “s:deactivate r 
for u” associated with role r. Since it is caused by disabling of a role, “disable r” must be a 
non-blocked event in E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ). Furthermore, as deactivation involves 
removing an active session, the role must have been in enabled state in interval (t-1, t). Thus the 
IF condition of Step (6a) is true. Hence, the THEN part of Step (6a) executes, adding event E into 
Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ). Therefore, E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ) after Step (6a). The 
deactivation events produced by a deassignment statement in Step 6(b) can be similarly outlined. 
Next, assume that deactivation event E is caused because of activation constraints. Then, E must 
have been caused to remove active user sessions that have expired or that cannot be retained 
because of some duration or cardinality constraint on role.    47
If E is caused because the session has expired then the remaining duration corresponding to the 
expired session is 0. Thus, the condition that is used by the FOR loop is satisfied for E in Step 
(6c). As a result, the statement inside the FOR loop is executed, E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ).  
If E is caused in order to ensure that the duration constraint on the associated role is not violated 
in interval (t, t+1), then E must have been selected by the selection criteria used to remove active 
user sessions so that the sessions allowed altogether do no violate the activation constraint. The 
fact that E has been caused means that the corresponding role r will remain enabled at t and after 
t. Thus, ‘disable r’ should not be a non-blocked event at time t and afterwards, or r should be 
enabled at time t. The first IF condition of Step (6d) checks for this and hence is true. The 
selection  criteria  is  used  only  if  the  remaining  total  number  of  sessions  so  far  (given  by 
|session(r) –DA|) cannot be allowed to be active for one more time unit. Thus, the inner IF 
condition is satisfied too. Hence, the event E is added in Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) by the 
THEN part. Therefore, E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) after Step 6(d). 
Case 6. E is caused by (f), i.e. E is an activation event that is not blocked and can be allowed by 
valid activation constraints at time t. 
Since E is caused at time t, there must be a run-time request at time (t-¨t), i.e, “E after ¨t” is 
in RQ(t-¨t) such that 0 £ t £  ¨t. Thus, the condition attached to the FOR loop of Step 7 is 
satisfied. Since E is caused, it must be true that the associated role r is enabled at t and afterwards, 
which means that the “disable r” is not a non-blocked event and r has already been in enabled 
state, or, alternatively, there is a non-blocked “enable r” event caused at time t. In addition, 
there must be a valid assignment of roles to users for granting an activation request. The first IF 
condition checks precisely for these; hence, it is satisfied. Since E is caused, it implies that the 
activation constraints can be satisfied. Hence, the inner IF condition is satisfied as it checks to see 
if the addition of the new activation request can be granted. Since all the conditions are satisfied, 
the THEN part of the inner IF statement is executed, adding E to Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ). 
Hence, E Î Caused(t, EV, ST, T, RQ). 
Proof of Theorem 4.1 - Proof of part (2) and (3) 
Steps 1-5 each look for a particular type of constraint in T and and events in RQ. Let ndRQ and 
naRQ be the number of activation and deactivation run-time requests scheduled for time t, and 
nadmin be the number of administrator’s runtime events scheduled for t, then we have nRQ = nadmin + 
naRQ + ndRQ. Steps 1-5 check for all constraints, triggers and the runtime request other than the   48
activation requests. And hence, total time taken for steps 1-5 is (nT + nadmin + ndRQ), considering nT  
includes the cost for checks involving triggers in Step 3.  
FOR loops of steps 6(a) - 6(c) each repeat at most nSm times, as each looks for all applicable 
sessions for each user who has activated role r and for whom the conditions are satisfied. The 
FOR loop of 6(d) is also bounded from above by nU (we can consider selection criteria algorithm 
to be linear in the number of users). Hence, for steps 6(a) - 6(d), the maximum complexity is nR 
(nSm+ nU) as these steps are repeated for each r. Step 7 considers all the activation constraints, 
hence giving a complexity of naRQ (note that the fact that step 7 is inside the FOR loop of step 6 
does not matter). Hence, the complexity is (nT + nadmin + ndRQ)  + nR (nSm+ nU) + naRQ. That is, the 
complexity is O(nT + nRQ + nR (nSm+ nU)). Since each of the above terms is finite, the 
algorithm terminates. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Proof of part 1 
By  theorem  4.1,  the  Caused(t,  EV,  ST,  CT,  T,  RQ)  produced  by  ComputeCausedSet(t) 
contains only those events that are caused at time t and satisfy all the constraints in T. Hence, to 
prove that the status update done by computeST(t) satisfies all the constraints in T, we need to 
prove that  the update done is with respect to each of the non-blocked events in the Caused(t, 
EV, ST, CT, T, RQ). This is because the non-blocked events of Caused(t, EV, ST, CT, T, RQ) are 
the only events that actually happen at time t. Since by definition 4.2.7, EV(t) = Caused(t, EV, 
ST, CT, T, RQ), we can proceed by showing that each of the events of nonblocked(EV(t) is 
considered by the algorithm. In addition, the algorithm needs to ensure that all the valid activation 
constraints in CT are also satisfied by the updated information, which is to say that the effect of 
all such constraints are considered by the algorithm. We will proceed step by step. 
Step 1 and 2:  In these steps, all the non-blocked deassignment events of EV(t) are considered. 
Since the presence of a u-snapshot associated with user u in Ur corresponding to the role r 
indicates that the role r has been assigned to user u, the removal of the u-snapshot corresponding 
to the user to whom the role r is deassigned correctly updates the effect of the deassignment 
event. Since ut contains all the activation status of a particular user associated with a role, the 
removal  of  the  u-snapshot  ut  completely  removes  all  such  information.  Similarly,  in  step  2, 
permissions that are deassigned from a role are removed from the permission list Pr associated 
with the role. The next earliest change to these new values of Ur and Pr occur at time t+1. We also 
note that no activation constraints affect deassignments. Hence steps 1 and 2 are in accord to 
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Step 3: In this step, all non-blocked events that disable roles are considered. Since a role r is 
disabled at t, its status is changed to disabled, which remains so until it is changed later, as 
there are no statements below step 3 that changes rt.status; the only change that can occur to this 
parameter afterwards is at time (t+1), which occurs if “enable r” event is non-blocked at time 
(t+1). As a role is disabled, all valid per-role activation constraints whose validity is not restricted 
by (I, P) or a duration D (and hence they are valid for each enabled duration of the role), must be 
reset to default values. This is done by each of the next set of IF statements. Furthermore, each 
per-user-role constraints must also be considered and corresponding associated parameter values 
reset. This is done by the FOR loop which considers each of the users assigned to the role being 
disabled.  We  note  that,  for  per-role  activation  constraints  of  type  (I,  P,  C)  and  (D,  C),  the 
updating of the corresponding parameter values is dictated by (I, P) and D respectively as is done 
in step 4 and are not affected by the disabling of a role. Hence, step 3 does the required update in 
accord with condition (1). 
Step 4: The fact that a constraint of form (I, P, C) or (D, C) which was in CT(t-1) but is not in 
CT(t) implies that these constraints are not in effect anymore (disabled). This step considers all 
such per-role activation constraints and reset the values of the corresponding parameters such as 
dra, nra, etc., to ¥. These parameter values can only be altered at t+1 or later; hence, the update is 
in accord with condition (1). 
Step 5: This step handles the effect of the enabling of a role r. First the status is updated to 
enabled. The first IF condition checks if a constraint of type C1 in one of forms (I, P, C), (D, 
C), or (C), is present. If it is, then dra is updated to the minimum of Dactive in C1 or the current 
value of dra.  If dra < ¥ then it implies that some valid constraint is restricting the role activation 
time and is left unchanged. If dra = ¥, then it means no constraint of type C1 has been active 
earlier.  Thus  the  update  essentially  conforms  to  the  semantics  and  hence  is  in  accord  with 
condition (1). Similar arguments apply to the remaining IF statements of step 5. 
Step 6: This step simply adds the permission p to the set Pr associated with the role r if “assign 
p to r” is a non-blocked element in EV(t). The presence of p in set Pr associated with the role r 
indicates that p is assigned to r and hence this update correctly establishes the status of the 
assignment until it is changed by a deassignment at time t+1 or after. 
Step 7: This step simply adds a u-snapshot, say ut, associated with user u to the set Ur that is 
associated with the role r if “assign r to u” is a non-blocked element in EV(t). The presence of 
ut in set Ur associated with the role r indicates that u is assigned to r and hence this update   50
correctly  establishes  the  status  of  the  assignment.  Furthermore,  the  set  of  sessions  and  their 
durations are currently empty. The remaining parameters are set to initial default values of ¥. 
Thus, the updates reflect that an assignment event occurs and is in accord with condition (1). 
Step 8: This step simply updates the effect of deactivation events. For each deactivation event, 
there  is  a  session  and  the  duration  associated.  Thus  for  a  (s:deactivate  r  for  u),  the 
associated session s and its associated duration d are removed from the u-snapshot of u associated 
with role r. Note that session s may still be present in which other roles are still active. In such a 
case, the session s will be present in the u-snapshot of u associated with the other roles. Thus 
removal of (s, d) is in accord with condition (1). 
Step 9: In this step, all non-blocked activation events are considered. Since a new activation of a 
role is being added, if there is a per-role cardinality constraint active at this time (rt.nra<µ), then 
rt.nra must be decremented, as required. The new value will be checked to control role activation 
events in the next run of computeCauseSet at (t+1). Note that we do not need to check if 
rt.nra=0,  because  the  reason  the  activation  event  is  in  nonblocked(EV(t))  is  because  no 
cardinality  constraint  has  blocked  the  activation  event,  as  is  done  in  step  7  of 
computeCauseSet.  Hence,  the  simple  decrement  operation  is  adequate.  Similar  argument 
applies the per-user-role cardinality constraint (the associated parameter is ut.nua). 
Each of the IF statements that follows updates the user parameter based on the type of per-user-
role or per-role constraint. The first IF statement checks to see if a per-user-role total activation 
constraint is active at time t. If it is active, then the corresponding user parameter dua is updated as 
specified. If the constraint form is (C1) then this value will be restricted for the duration dua or till 
the time the corresponding role r is disabled (in which case, step 3 will reset this value when it is 
updated next). The ELSE part considers the per-role constraint that applies to the activation of r 
by u. In that case, the default value specified is assigned to dua. We note that this default value, if 
not explicitly specified, is equal to the value specified for the role, for example, Dactive in this 
case). Hence, the IF statement updates the user parameter as required. Similar arguments apply to 
the rest of the IF statements.  The remaining duration for the activation of r by u is then added to 
sets Su and Du, so that they can be decremented at each time instant until they become 0 (in which 
case  the  computeCausedSet()  will  remove  it  in  step  6(c)).  Hence,  step  8  updates  the 
required parameters in accord with condition (1). 
Step 9: In this step, for each enabled role, the duration of each session is decremented. We note 
that the decrement will not make any individual duration negative because such a possibility is   51
eliminated by Step 6(c) in computeCausedSet. Similarly, the total active duration of the role 
is also adjusted. The decrement value represents the total value that will be decremented at the 
end of the interval (t, t+1). The else part simply decrements the value of dra by one. This is 
necessary because there may be a per–role constraint of type (I, P, C) or (D, C) on the role which 
is valid even when the role is disabled. Similarly, each user values are also decremented. Thus, 
step 9 updates all the duration values as required. 
Hence, it follows that the condition of (1) is satisfied by ST(t) produced by the algorithm. 
Proof of part 2 and 3 
We look at the complexity of each step and sum them up to get the overall complexity. The FOR 
loop of step 1 repeats for each of the deassignment events that is non-blocked. At worst, it repeats 
(nR.nU) times. Similarly, the worst case for step 2 is (nR.nP). Step 3 handles role-disabling events. 
At worst all roles need to be disabled. The inner FOR loop repeats for all users assigned to each 
role. Thus, again the worst case for step 3 is (nR.nU). Step 4 checks for four different types of per-
role activation constraints active at the time. Since, there are nR roles, the maximum number of 
such constraints is 4nR. The FOR loop of step 5 repeats at most nR times. Similar to step 2, step 6 
has worst case of (nR.nP). Similar to step 1, step 7 has worst case of (nR.nU). Each of steps 8 and 9 
is bounded by the maximum number of sessions allowed in the system (nR.nSm). Step 10 repeats 
for each role, and the worst case occurs when the else part is executed, giving the worst case of 
(nR.nU).  Because nR, nU,  nP and nSm are each finite, we see that each step terminates. Hence the 
algorithm computeST terminates. Furthermore, the overall complexity of the algorithm is: 
=  nR.nU + nR.nP + nR.nU + 4nR + nR + nR.nP + nR.nU + 2 nR.nSm + nR.nU 
Thus the complexity of the algorithm can be expressed as: 
O(nR.(nU + nP + nSm)). 
 